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ABSTRACT
THE AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE QUAGMIRE:
A MAJOR CAUSE AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The primary purpose of this thesis is to clarify possible 
legitimate interactions between churches and government bodies in 
America. Finding that the present interpretation of the First 
Amendment has actually precipitated much of the current contro­
versy, evidence is presented of its lack of validity. Instead an 
alternative interpretation is offered that clearly shows that the 
American colonists had come to recognize an entirely new manner in 
which to organize a society. This new manner of organization gave 
sovereignty to the individual in two major societal systems: the
political and the religious. The consequence of this was the 
recognition that churches and governments are simply institutions 
organized by people. Each of which has its own responsibilities 
within society. There was no need to separate the two into 
autonomous spheres. They both were recognized as two distinct 
institutions of the same body of people, who held sovereignty over 
them. It is after a presentation of these facts that the 
concluding chapter suggests a new configuration for church/state 
interaction that would give more clarity to future contacts 
between the religious and political institutions of American 
society.
iii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
In reviewing the literature regarding religious freedom and 
church/state interaction in America, I found a great deal of
controversy. Though the nation appears to celebrate freedom of
religion as the most important liberty offered by our society, the 
"issues involving government and religion are among the most 
contentious confronting us as a nation.”1 Seeking to understand 
why there is such discord in the area of government and religion 
interaction, I uncovered a major hindrance to ever resolving the 
situation. The primary difficulty originates with the accepted, 
traditional way of interpreting the First Amendment of the 
Constitution. This interpretation maintains that, within what are 
called its religious clauses, there exists not only the provision 
of religious freedom for individuals, but also a requirement for a
separation of church and state. However, there is no agreement as
to the exact meaning of "separation of church and state." Instead, 
as Martin E. Marty noted, it is "recognized by many that the 
constitutional tradition addresses many different interests and, 
therefore, interpretations are ample, competitive, and tangled."2
This continual demand for a separation, as well as for a 
definition of the proper means of providing it, is a hotly debated
1
2topic, which appears irresolvable.3 However, since it is
believed to be the Constitution that requires separation, at 
least one very clear, consequence has been produced. Our 
government, in attempting to show its separation from churches, 
has maintained a hands-off approach toward them. The result of 
this behavior is the implication that the Constitution itself 
guarantees special, unique rights to churches, which sets them 
apart from government authority. This creates the impression that 
there are two authorities within American society, each with its 
own autonomous domain.
The fact that this perception has become so thoroughly 
recognized by our society can be seen in this comment by Milton R. 
Konvitz. "When we speak of freedom of religion, we tend to think 
of freedom of churches, freedom of organized, institutional 
religions."4 It is apparent that, because of the present inter­
pretation of the First Amendment, there has occurred a bestowing 
of an independent freedom upon the churches. This, in turn, has 
created an area of our society in which government appears to have 
no authority. This situation is a major component in the current 
church/state controversy.
The following two citations demonstrate the truth of the 
assertion that the present traditional interpretation of the First 
Amendment has resulted in placing churches outside the jurisdic­
tion of government. The first one comes from a discussion at a 
Symposium on the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime,
3reported in 23ie_J-QUma] of Criminal Law and Criminology. Fall,
1982. This discussion concerned how government might be able to 
detect the criminal diversion of church funds to personal use. 
The obstacle of the present interpretation of the First Amendment 
was noted:
The excessive entanglement test as refined in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman and Tilton v. Richardson limits 
the ability of the state and federal governments to 
detect fiscal wrongdoing in churches. In effect, the 
first amendment will always stand as a major obstacle 
to the government's goal of protecting the public 
from fraud and corruption occurring in connection 
with church funds.5
The article continued by pointing to another indicator of this 
“supposed constitutional barrier" that has been erected in the 
relationship between government and the churches. It involved the 
government's inability to require any type of financial reporting 
from religious institutions. By direction from Congress, the 
Internal Revenue Code has exempted all tax-exempt religious 
organizations from filing Form 990, the annual information return 
required of all other tax-exempt organizations. The rationale 
cited here is the need to demonstrate the required separation by 
having as little surveillance as possible.6 Nevertheless, the
article concludes with a very real concern regarding the need for
the government to be able to speak to churches. This final quote
demonstrates that concern.
Most people would probably agree that the state 
should not interfere in church affairs. But the concern
4there is with bona fide religious organizations. However, 
increasingly, there are reports of churches being founded 
as vehicles to enrich private individuals in the form of 
tax savingB or profits generated from fraudulent solicita­
tions, although the extent of the problem is not known.
The government should discourage the misuse of churches... 
Still, the fear that the government is intruding into a 
sphere of sovereignty where it does not belong can cause 
considerable resistance to state legislation and 
enforcement proceedings.7
This phrase, "sphere of sovereignty," clearly points to the idea 
that the churches have a presumed, independent sovereignty free 
from any supervision by public authority.
The second citation comes from Alan Ware's book, Between
Profit and State; Intermediate Organizations in Britain and.the
United States. It is very important to be aware of the different 
ways England and the United States have dealt with religion and 
churches. English law, particularly since the nineteenth century, 
has fully recognized the religious freedom of the people living 
there. However, there are several important differences between 
the English treatment of churches and the American one. Note the 
impact that present Constitutional interpretation has had on the 
American response.
In England, religious organizations are held to be legally 
charitable entities, which means that they are tax-exempt. This 
legal concept of charity is substantially the one established in 
the sixteenth century and codified in the famous Elizabethan 
Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.8 It holds that the advance­
ment of religion is a charitable activity. Since this status
5provides tax exemption, the English acknowledge that an "important 
indirect" aid is received by religious bodies being entitled to 
it.® In recognizing this benefit, English law has provided some 
restrictions as to what types of groups are granted religious 
charitable status. In order to be classified as a religion, there 
"must involve some form of worship of a deity, so that bodies 
merely advancing ethical principles are not considered 
charitable."10 The other restriction is that the activities of 
the charitable body must benefit the public at large, therefore 
not all activities of religious organizations are given charitable 
status.11 So here we have a country which provides religious 
freedom to all within its borders, but whose government still has 
the authority to speak to its religious bodies.
How does this differ from the treatment in the United States? 
We, too, designate our religious organizations as charitable 
bodies, which comes from our own acceptance of the same 1601 
Statute of Charitable Uses. But there the similarities almost 
totally cease to exist. Ware continues his discussion by 
describing U.S. behavior:
The prohibition in the Constitution of the estab­
lishment of religion has actually been interpreted by 
government agencies, and indeed by the courts, to limit 
any investigation they might carry out to determine 
whether an organization is religious and how the organi­
zation operates. American courts have also held that 
nontheistic organizations are entitled to tax exemption, 
if this is available to theistic groups. Nor has the 
Internal Revenue Service, federal income tax legislation, 
nor any U.S. Treasury regulation, ever defined the terms 
'religious' or 'religion.' Moreover, since it is laws
6on non-profit organizations, rather than laws relating to 
charitable trusts, which are the ones most affecting 
religious groups, there has been a tendency towards a much 
more liberal interpretation of what can be registered as a 
religious group. For example Oleck notes that:
in early 1970, atheist Madelyn Murray O'Hair, 
well know for her opposition to all religion, 
said in Austin, Texas, that she and her husband,
Richard, had organized the Poor Richard's__
Church for tax evasion purposes. She said,
'From here on we're going to take every 
exemption.'
Oleck goes on to observe that there have also been 
advertisements in newspapers explaining how people can 
'turn themselves' into churches. Like federal legisla­
tion, state legislation has been unconcerned with religion: 
non-profit laws have rarely addressed the question of 
what is to constitute a religion, and this has permitted 
religion to become a broad category in non-profit 
legislation.12
From both citations, it can clearly be seen that by making 
the authority of the Constitution the grounding for a required 
separation between churches and the government, American govern­
ment bodies have been very reluctant to speak directly to the 
churches. This reluctance is shown by the failure to define the 
terms "religion" or "religious." The term "church” can also be 
added to the list of words that legislation has never explained, 
though all three terms are used extensively in it, particularly in 
regards to the tax-exempt status of churches and other religious 
entities.13 The resulting effect of this lack of definition is 
greater confusion in arriving at any acceptable solutions to 
issues involving government and religion.
Even the terminology, "church/state," adds confusion to the
7discussion. Although it can be very useful as a shortcut and as
a symbol of current problems, it suffers from weaknesses and 
inadequacies. Here is a good explanation of one inadequacy:
Church-state terminology comes to us from Europe 
and recalls a background which is quite unlike the 
American scene. It has its origin in a time when the 
church was indeed a single monolithic Church and 
governmental power was centered in a single ruler.
It is inadequate to describe the American situation 
because of both the multitude of churches in this 
country and the dispersion of governmental power among 
the federal government, the states, and the local 
communities.
In our situation, it is more illuminating to call 
them problems of the interrelationship of the civil and 
religious communities. This phrase at least makes clear 
that we are discussing communities that embrace in part 
a common membership.14
It was after extensive probing to understand the causes of 
this existing controversy regarding how to separate these two 
communities, that I arrived at the conclusion that our continual 
holding up of the Constitution as the defining ground for separ­
ation had actually precipitated the controversy. Seeking to 
demonstrate that this supposed Constitutionally required 
separation is being honored, government bodies have maintained a 
hands-off approach toward churches. This behavior has created the 
impression that churches are set apart from government and its 
authority, thus giving the churches the appearance of having their 
own domain of sovereignty within American society. Even the 
American people have come to view this as a clear requirement of 
the Constitution. Paul J. Weber has asserted that:
8The term "separation of church and state," 
although never appearing in the Constitution, 
has become so embedded in American consciousness 
that it seems to sum up what is meant by the 
First Amendment religion clauses.16
After recognizing that much of the problem comes from this 
one source, the traditional interpretation of the First Amendment, 
the need became to find a means to move past it. From further 
research, I have concluded that the present accepted interpreta­
tion lacks evidence to substantiate its claim of validity. 
Instead, I offer an alternative interpretation that is much more 
consistent with the historical facts. It basically holds that the 
American colonists had come to view the relationship between 
individuals, government, and churches in an entirely new manner 
that caused separation to naturally occur between these two major 
institutions of society. Theirs was an entirely new manner for 
organizing a society. For the first time, individuals held 
sovereignty over their own political and religious lives. In this 
new ordering of a society, all needed to work together politically 
but religiously each was individually responsible for self. A 
major concern at that time was involved with integrating these two 
dimensions of life, rather than separating them into two distinct 
arenas of living.
Yet, today, the issue is not on how individuals should 
integrate the political and the religious areas of their lives, 
but rather on how the relationship of the institutions of these 
two spheres of life, churches and government, should be separated.
9It is a situation that calls for clarity. A necessity clearly 
articulated by Stephen V. Monsma in his discussion of what he 
calls "the church-state conundrum."
U.S. society and legal theory alike support the 
separation of church and state, yet the two, as vital 
forces in society, cannot be kept in hermetically 
sealed compartments. However, there are no agreed-on 
principles to guide when and how the two are to intersect. 
That this conundrum is likely to grow increasingly 
serious is indicated by the expanding vitality, diversity, 
and political and social activism of religion and the 
expanding role of government in modern society. There 
are many points at which religion and government intersect, 
and those points of intersection are becoming more, not 
less, numerous and more, not less, intense.16
The need is for an expanded conversation on possible legitimate 
interaction. A means by which to achieve this is in exposing the 
incorrect idea that the Constitution has defined the form this 
separation is to take. This currently accepted interpretation 
maintains that churches are separated from government by setting 
them outside the authority of government. After removing that 
barrier, the hope is that new, clearer relationships might be 
explored and established. The first step in this process is to 
provide proof that this conclusion is true and to suggest at least 
one possible new opening.
I have organized my argument into five basic chapters. Each 
one deals with an independent part of the argument to discredit 
this traditional interpretation. Chapter II begins with a discus­
sion of basic sociological understandings of the components of a 
society. It includes a section on the development of a new way to
10
organize a society that began during the Colonial period. Chapter 
III looks closer at the historical background from which the 
federal government emerged. It will seek to show that the 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights, as defining instruments of 
the federal government, were simply removing the political ability 
at the federal level to establish any correct, normative religious 
thought. In addition, the First Amendment established a responsi­
bility for the federal government. It was to preserve an environ­
ment in which all individuals were free to seek their own 
religious understandings. The writers of the Constitution and 
members of the First Congress were not concerned with churches; 
that was a province under the supervision of state governments. 
Chapter IV deals with the behavior of the Protestant churches to 
the environment of America. It is important to understand the 
manner in which churches reacted to the continuing deregulation of 
religion from government control after the Revolutionary War. 
Looking for a specific area in which to seek new clarification, 
Chapter V takes up the subject of how our present tax system 
currently deals with religious groups. And finally, Chapter VI, 
armed with clearer understandings regarding the facts of the 
situation, contains some specific suggestions for a new, inter­
active configuration between the federal government and our 
churches.
By challenging the validity of the currently held interpret­
ation of the First Amendment, my hope is to remove the supposed
11
constitutional barrier that limits discussion of the role of 
religious freedom to the narrow idea that the act of separating 
the institutions of church and state comprises its primary intent. 
My major objective throughout this research is to expand the 
discussion not only by adding new considerations of possible 
legitimate interaction between religious institutions and our 
public authority, but also by encouraging a fuller discussion 
regarding the meaning of religious freedom for all citizens.
12
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CHAPTER II
A SOCIETY AND ITS SYSTEMS
In researching something that is reported to be a known fact, 
one needs to look for the grounds that must exist to substantiate 
this claim. As already noted, there is a persistent claim that 
one of the clearest things our Constitution did was require a 
separation between church and state. The manner in which this has 
been achieved is to set them apart into two independent arenas. 
It is easy to find examples justifying this behavior in the 
literature. For example, William Lee Miller holds:
But the unique liberty in which the American 
nation was "conceived" included more than personal 
religious liberty, as it would be understood world­
wide; it includes also the full institutional 
independence of the federal union from all churches 
and of those churches from the federal state. The 
mother country, and some other democracies, would 
come in time to have a religious liberty equal to, 
perhaps in some informal ways surpassing, that in 
the United States, but without this constitutional 
separation.1 [Emphasis mine.]
Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner in their book, In Search of the 
Republic, maintain that, "[o]ne of the most radical innovations in 
the founding of America was the formal, constitutional separation 
of church and state."2 The frequency with which one reads such 
certainty confirms that this view of an existing, constitutionally
15
required separation has taken on the characteristics of being an 
established fact. But is it? What grounds exist to substantiate 
that this claim is truly an actual fact?
The first question that needs to be asked is: is it possible 
to have a "full, institutional independence of the federal union 
from all churches and of those churches from the federal union?" 
This idea completely violates basic sociological logic. As Monsma 
noted: "the two, as vital forces in society, cannot be kept in
hermetically sealed compartments."3 When sociologists look at a 
society, they believe that they are looking at a humanly-organized 
entity that consists of various integrated systems. There are 
basically five systems expected to be found: economic, political,
social, cultural and religious. One of the frequent goals is to 
see how these various systems interact with one another. It is 
never expected that any two of the them could be completely 
isolated from the other. The explanation for a complete rejection 
of any possible isolation or complete independence of any of the 
systems is that the individuals involved in all five systems are 
the same group of people. The systems simply consist of different 
configurations of the same group of individuals around diverse 
core needs of human society.
These diverse core needs of a society require the creation of 
different, specialized institutions to deal with them. In this 
case, the two specific systems under consideration, are the 
political system and the religious one. The basic institutional
16
unit used by the political system is government; for the religious 
system, it is the church or churches, in our case. Since each 
institution is concerned with different specific needs of the 
society, they each have uniquely different functions. The primary 
function of government is to provide order and security for all 
citizens, while the church's primary function involves the provi­
sion of an organized means to meet the human need for religion. 
In explaining "the need for religion," the following description 
is being used:
Religion is not just a belief that some 
mysterious being exists. It is, on the contrary, 
a complex network of beliefs concerning morality, 
the purpose of life, the nature of the individual, 
and the ultimate explanation of things. Our rational, 
scientific experience of the world is fragmented and 
incomplete, and religion attempts to bring these 
fragments together to form a coherent, meaningful 
image of the whole.4
In America, all citizens together comprise the constituency 
of the societal systems in various configurations. The most 
inclusive of the different configurations is the federal govern­
mental system. It includes all of the citizens, as compared to 
other political groupings at the state, county and local levels, 
which have smaller constituencies of citizens. Traditionally, our 
society's religious system is viewed as including all of our 
churches; but here, as in the political system, the churches 
simply have different groupings of citizens. This collection of 
individual churches some large, some small; some independent.
17
others organized into large corporate bodies: some local in
character, while others are international represent a large
portion of our society's organized corporate life.
If one of the primary functions of government is to provide 
order, can government be completely without any power to supervise 
such an important segment of our society? It would be a complete 
negligence of duty, if this were so. If this is true, the
Constitution of the United States, as the instrument that designed 
our federal system, could not have placed churches into a 
separate, isolated realm, set apart from the federal government 
and its authority to supervise. At the same time, the religious 
system of a society, which has the responsibility to provide 
meaning to existence for the people, must be able to interact with 
all the other systems of the society. Churches, as its main 
institution, must be able to share their understandings with the 
society at large. It is completely impossible to expect full, 
institutional independence to exist between these two systems, 
each of which serve different, basic needs of the same group of 
people. By discrediting this current belief that it is the First 
Amendment which mandated that separation exist between these 
institutions, possible new dimensions of legitimate interaction 
between the religious and the political systems could develop and 
be explored.
Historically, the idea for the need to separate church and 
state came to us from European experience with established
18
churches after the Reformation. From the Egyptians up to events 
in eighteenth century Europe, the accepted policy was committed to 
having an official or established religion in each country. This 
was based on a belief that for civic order, the state (government) 
that controlled a specific geographic area had to be united with 
the religion of the citizens of that area. Therefore, only one 
religion could be allowed. This understanding is very clearly 
shown in this quote:
For over a thousand years prior to the settlement of 
America, the Old World had lived under the belief that the 
unity of church and state was necessary for the maintenance
of civil order The great fear of the state had always been
disorder and disunion, and religion was seen as a unifying, 
legitimizing force to perpetuate civil life.6
This belief that there needed to be unity of church and state was 
further emphasized after the Reformation. Each of the individual 
European states emerged as minature realms, each with its own 
state religion, each holding to the recognized truth of that day 
that only one religion should be accepted by the state. As Sidney 
Mead maintains:
Each Established church that resulted made for 
its place in its nation the same sort of claims that 
the universal Catholic Church had made for its ubiquitous 
transnational authority In this situation no substan­
tive difference was made between church and commonwealth. 
Both were merely ways of looking at the same body of 
people. This was evidenced in the legal structure by 
the merging of monarch into God, legitimated by some 
forms of the doctrine of the divine rights of kings."6
It was uniformity that was felt to be essential to maintaining
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national unity and internal power. And so, during the two 
centuries following the disruptive forces of the Reformation 
within the European religious world, we can see each of the 
various rulers adhering to what was then currently accepted 
wisdom. Each determined which church was sanctioned in the realm 
as the official one and then persecuted or tolerated the others as 
he choose. And "yet in attempting to enforce this uniformity, 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe was engulfed in 
religious wars and persecutions.'"7 Rather than establishing 
order, the establishing of a particular church resulted in chaos. 
This Americans had both seen and felt, many of them having 
immigrated to the Colonies because of government persecution due 
only to their own personally-held religious beliefs.
It is from this history of persecution by governments for 
personally-held religious beliefs, that the tradition maintains 
that one of the clearest intents of the writers of our Constitu­
tion was to firmly separate church and state. However, the 
validity of this conjecture is not upheld by research. Rather, by 
the time of the writing of the Constitution, it had clearly been 
recognized that the strength of government was not dependent on a 
single religious belief system. This new understanding had come 
from several sources.
First, from England there had come the new realization that 
religious thinking could not be controlled by force. In 1689, one 
hundred years prior to the writing of the Constitution, England
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had passed the Toleration Act, which ended for all time the 
judicial persecution of her citizens simply because of religious 
belief. In fact, it was becoming recognized that by allowing the 
individual to have freedom in religious belief, the stability of 
the government was enhanced. However, questions remained regard­
ing this new freedom, for as Gerald R. Cragg noted: it was then
held that it "might still be restricted, but the attempt to 
organize the religious life of the nation", in either England or 
the American colonies, "according to a single pattern was 
abandoned” by the early eighteenth-century.8 However, he 
continued, a new societal problem surfaced at this time. It 
involved the rivalry between freedom and authority: exactly what
is the source of authority and how do we define freedom.® This 
is a rivalry with which society is still struggling. In fact, it 
is probably the major problem that is not being addressed in the 
discussion involving legitimate interaction between our political 
and religious systems. How do we balance authority and freedom 
between individuals and institutions, and between institutions?
Another source of evidence, confirming that the old belief 
that it was necessary for church and state to be united in order 
to provide civic order, had already been rejected in the American 
colonies, is found in viewing the behavior of the colonists them­
selves. Their experience had shown them, over the first seventy- 
five years of the eighteenth century (1700-1775), that uniformity 
in religious thought was not a requirement for unity within the
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civic realm. They had witnessed men of different religious 
persuasions working together in developing the commerce and in 
increasing the growth of business within the colonies. They 
continued to witness great cooperation between people from 
different churches and religious faiths during the years of the 
Revolutionary War. The belief that men could not work together
economically or politically unless united under one church creed 
had been completely discredited.10 But that did not mean that 
the importance of religion or religious thinking was discarded. 
There continued to be a wide acknowledgement that religious 
thinking was of great value and absolutely necessary for the 
nation's new government to be able to govern well. This 
understanding that the citizens needed to be concerned and
involved in religious thinking was what John Adams was observing 
when he wrote: "Our Constituion was made only for a moral and a
religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of
any other."11 This data validates that beginning early in the 
eighteenth century, the knowledge that religious diversity was not 
detrimental to civil order had been recognized. Consequently, it 
seems very unlikely that there was any urgent call to provide a 
constitutional separation between church and state, for separation 
was occurring naturally.
Instead, the men who designed this new form of government 
were instituting new ideas that did not rest upon what had 
previously been considered necessary for government to exist.
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(T)hey were designing political institutions with a 
differing ground and beginning point than those of the past. 
They did not begin with an explicit and formal affirmation 
of the nation's theistic foundations, as in some sense the
nations of the Old Order had done ; but they also did not
begin the state with the repudiation of that foundation, as 
revolutionary nations to come would do. As we have already 
said, James Madison and his colleagues came to the position 
— a new one in the political thought of the West— that in 
this republic all of the parts and pieces of the complicated 
governmental machinery shall rest, in the end, upon the whole 
and undivided people.12
But from where did the grounding or root for this new tinder- 
standing about government come? The Constitution had declared the 
federal government to be neither a covenant with God nor the 
result of an authorization from God. At the same time, it clearly 
rejected the idea that there was no God for it took great care in 
providing for religion and religious belief. Instead, it insti­
tuted the new idea that the source of authority for government 
came directly from the people. It was "the whole and undivided 
people," who established government and who were responsible for 
its good ordering. A concept this revolutionary in human under­
standing could not have suddenly appeared and been accepted. 
There must have been an evolutionary development, which can be 
traced, for this to have so clearly occurred. By more fully 
understanding this evolution in thought regarding the basis for 
government, a clearer perception of the total extent of the 
changes in the relationship of the systems of a society can be 
gained. It was this new ordering of the systems that changed old 
relationships, particularly the one between the institutions of
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government and churches.
In looking for the ground from which these new ideas had 
originated, one finds a major portion of it involved a developing 
differentiation between the responsibilities or spheres of concern 
that institutions such as churches and governments had on the 
lives of individuals. This setting apart of governmental and 
religious concerns was a major development that had been brought 
to the American colonies by various dissenting Protestant 
Christian groups.
This division of responsibilities began almost immediately in 
our history. An example of this can be seen in the Mayflower 
Compact of 1620. The Pilgrims had come as a religious Christian 
body, but prior to landing, they recognized the need for a means 
under which to live together. The earliest source of the text 
explained the situation in this manner:
This day, before we came to harbor, observing 
some not well affected to unity and concord, but gave 
some appearance of faction, it was thought good there 
should be an association and agreement that we should 
combine together in one body, and to submit to such 
government and governors as we should by common consent 
agree to make and choose, and set our hands to this that 
follows word for word.13
Having acknowledged this need, they combined themselves together 
"into a civil body politic," for their own better ordering and 
preservation by being able "to enact, constitute, and frame such 
just and equal laws... for the general good of the colony."14 
This was the first sign of a new understanding that departed from
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the historical wisdom of how to organize the systems of a society. 
In this new wisdom, government, the body politic, was made up of 
the people involved. And this body of people as individuals were
responsible for the preservation of good ordering together.
However, by recognizing individuals as the responsible parties for 
government, what now was the role of religion in corporate life? 
Being able to give answer to this question is very important. It 
is by understanding how the people who settled America came to 
view the importance of religion in their individual lives and 
their own individual responsiblity for the proper ordering of
community life, that a clearer comprehension of the new ideas
regarding the relationship between political and religious 
thinking can be seen.
Other evidence that confirms that these Christian colonists 
were developing new understandings regarding how government was to 
work and how it was to be related to churches in their lives can 
be seen in additional historical facts. Charles A. Barker in his
book, American Convictions: Cycles Qf..Ei.ibllc Thouflht 16QQ-185Q,
cites four major traditions that have comprised the foundation of 
our national thought. The one relevant to this discussion is the
tradition of the "reformist religious thought, which, to the 
middle of the eighteenth century contributed more than any other 
set of ideas to change the way church and state related to one 
another."16 This historical process, in which the writing of 
the Constitution and its Bill of Rights was a climactic event,
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began back in England and was brought to the Colonies by the Free 
Church movement of Christian groups such as: the Anabaptists, the 
English Separatists, and the Quakers.
Roger Williams (1603-83) is listed as one of the first in 
America to articulate this new comprehension that churches and 
public authority needed to be fully separated from one another in 
their organization. Edmund S. Morgan, after a careful reading of 
the complete works of Williams, came to recognize that this man's
new comprehension of relationships was always "consistent with an
almost systematic set of ideas about church and state that he was 
developing."16 His story, therefore, is an account of a 
progressive unfolding of a logic that continued to be accepted by 
many others over the next century. These ideas became one of the 
major components in the grounding for a new kind of differenti­
ation between the two institutions of church and state. But it 
also clearly included a role for the individual citizen. James E. 
Ernst in his book, The Political Thought of Roger Williams, first 
published in 1929, pointed out in his concluding remarks, that:
In his whole-hearted devotion to discovering a
new basis for social life, he left no system or theory
of state unchallenged. Although the cast of his thought 
was social rather than theological, he eventually realized 
that the establishment of a,new system of relationship 
between church and state and individual was the only kev 
to a new social order. [Emphasis mine.]17
Here is a thumbnail sketch of Williams' most important views. 
In regards to "the church," the final position of this man of
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extremely devout faith, as reported by Morgan, was:
Williams continued to explore his own orthodox
assumptions He finally arrived at the position that
there was no true church in the world and therefore 
every man needed to serve God by himself alone, without 
any church at all.18
Thus he withdrew from the Baptist church he had founded and 
declared himself to be a "seeker," that is, one who accepts the 
fundamental beliefs of Christianity but does not profess a 
particular creed. This continual searching for true understanding 
was to consume Williams all of his life and it led him into 
questions not only regarding ecclesiastical life but also civil 
life.1®
In the founding of Providence, Rhode Island, Williams began 
applying the principles his thinking was generating. Here he laid 
down a definite sphere of action for both the church and the 
state, giving each their own particular domain, and he made the 
state a servant to the individual man. Ernst describes this new 
organizational structure in these words:
Liberty of conscience and religious liberty is 
made a recognized principle of constitutional law.
The church and state are held separate and distinct 
in the essential nature and object of each. And the 
church is made a civil corporation with only corporation 
rights and sub.iect to state contnol.-in its .civiL-CorPorate 
activities which the state is required to protect and 
regulate. Membership in the church body, like that of 
any other civil corporation, neither increases nor 
diminishes any of the rights and privileges of a citizen. 
[Emphasis mine.]20
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This new organizational arrangement was necessary from the changed 
relationship that Williams believed was now true between humans 
and God. Morgan pointed out, "Williams demanded the separation of
the state not merely from the church but from God  Williams
believed that with the coming of Christ, God had dissolved the 
combination of state and church as a single holy institution."21 
God no longer had a covenant with any of the nations of humankind 
as He had had with the nation of Israel. "No subsequent govern­
ment had His sponsorship, none was authorized to act in His 
behalf."22 Thus, Roger Williams' theological logic removed any 
religious powers from the civil government of any group of people, 
as he had done earlier with the churches. (There no longer was a 
true church in the world. Therefore, every man needed to serve 
God by himself alone, without any church at all.) But that did 
not mean that government was no longer necessary.
It did not follow that Christians needed no govern­
ments. Governments there must be and Christians must join 
other men in establishing them and submitting to them. But 
no government should expect the divine assistance, guidance,
and authority that God had given to Israel A government
could have only the powers of the people who created it, 
and no people was now invested with religious power.23
Thus, Williams' ultimate position was a complete differentiation 
between church and state. Both were simply institutions devised 
by men to met their own needs. By ruling out government's respon­
sibility for the spiritual welfare of its citizens, Williams still 
contended that government was responsible for the protection of
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its citizens' bodies and their goods, which, in turn required the 
enforcement of precepts that we would describe as moral.24 
These precepts he believed to be the second table of the moral
code delivered by Moses (commandments five through ten), which he 
held had actually been given to all people of every nation and 
religion through each person's individual conscience. Here begins 
the new understanding regarding the wisdom of an individual's 
conscience.
God's creatures, wherever they might live and 
whatever might be their destination in the world to 
come, had generally been able to recognize right from 
wrong in the affairs of this world, because God had 
endowed all men with conscience to guide their conduct. 
[Emphasis mine.]25
Williams found no unique talents among Christians or their 
churches for enforcing moral behavior. All men had be given the 
means to do right by God Himself in the form of their own individ­
ual consciences. It was the presence of conscience in all that 
would allow people to govern themselves rightly. Thus the 
function of government was to establish the right means to live 
together well; it had no role in establishing or dictating the 
right way to believe religiously. This was the responsibility of 
each individual, who was to seek knowledge of God and His desires 
for right behavior on an individual basis.
In regards to churches, "Roger Williams said frankly that 
they are made by man and are as subject to rewriting as is any 
other contract."26 God no longer made covenants with churches
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or groups of people; God was now relating only to individuals. 
Churches were simply voluntary associations of individuals seeking 
an understanding and knowledge of God together. Hugh Spurgin in 
his concluding remarks credited Williams with having synthesized 
ideas borrowed from others in order to lay a logical groundwork 
for new approaches to God and to government that profoundly 
influenced both American governmental organization and the 
spiritual understanding of its citizens.27 The importance of 
Roger Williams and his thinking becomes apparent with the 
recognition that it represents major, new understandings regarding 
the relationship of individuals to God, to churches, and to 
government that, over the next century of our history, became 
accepted knowledge among the people.
One consequence of this new thinking about government and its 
responsibilities was to relieve it from the pressure of having to 
contain an element of divinity.28 Government no longer had a 
direct relationship with God, that was a province controlled by 
individuals. The implication of this belief is that responsibil­
ity for correct living resides with each individual living in the 
community. Each person possessed a God-given conscience, that 
he/she was to draw upon for guidance to do that which is right in 
conduct with others and away from that which is wrong. Religion 
was not removed from the concerns of life. It provided the needed 
guidance to living, while government was involved with seeking to 
live well together. Both the individual's desire for proper and
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just government and the individual's religious desire to have a 
right relationship with God were tied together. Harold J. Berman's 
essay, "Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State," 
confirms this understanding of the integrated behavior of people 
living in the eighteenth-century.
"A person's relationship to God was understood 
to involve his active participation in the life of the 
community. More than that, religion was understood to 
be not only a matter of personal faith and personal 
morality but also a matter of collective responsibility 
and collective identity."29
The evidence given in this chapter indicates that American 
colonists had begun to accept new relational arrangements between 
the necessary systems of a society. One of the prinicpal changes 
involved the position of individuals. Individuals were no longer 
viewed as the controlled. This new freedom was visible in both 
the political and the religious systems. The resulting change 
within the political system of society was the relocation of 
authority for legitimating government to that of the individuals 
involved. With the writing of the Constitution, this authority 
was recognized to be "the whole and undivided people."
At the same time, though the principal authority within the 
religious system remained with God, individuals were now recog­
nized to be free to pursue their own personal relationship with 
God. There no longer was a need for any church's guidance in 
order to seek God and His way to live. This change came from the 
eventual conclusion reached by the "reformist religious thought"
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embraced by dissenting Christian groups. Responsibility was 
placed directly upon the individual "to serve God alone." Each 
individual, by using their God-given conscience in making 
decisions for their own behavior and for the general good of all, 
would clearly serve God. There was no outside force that could 
either control the freedom to decide for self or relieve the duty 
to decide for self.
One of the consequences of this conclusion was that churches 
became recognized as human-organized institutions, i.e., voluntary 
associations of individuals seeking an understanding and knowledge 
of God together. The fact that there were differences in their 
various creeds led to a realization that no one could dictate a 
singular, correct manner for religious thought. It is the need to 
maintain this freedom for which government became responsible. 
However, by allowing this freedom to be universal, the authority 
and control possessed by church bodies was clearly threatened.
The next chapter will look closer at evidence that confirms 
this conclusion regarding the eighteenth-century position of 
churches within the American society. In addition, it explains 
the purpose for the inclusion of the word "religion" in the 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Here the concern was to 
clarify that the federal government fully recognized its lack of 
authority to declare a specific, normative religious thought. It 
was absolutely necessary on the national level to demonstrate that 
all individual religious faith was protected. One purpose was
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clearly to gain the support of a majority of the people for the 
new Constitutional government.30
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CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Evidence of the continuing acceptance among a large number of 
American colonists regarding these new understandings concerning 
individuals, religion and churches, is provided by the rhetoric 
used and the behavior displayed during the Great Awakening of the 
1730s and 1740s. This was an event that touched all the colonies. 
In fact, this general revival of evangelical religion has been 
cited as "the first movement that gave the colonies any sense of 
common identity."1 It also severely challenged the controlling 
authority of organized church bodies, both established and 
dissenting ones, over the freedom of individuals. This challenge 
to authority was felt by many of the opponents of the Awakening to 
pose a threat not only to churches, but also to the political and 
social stability of American society.2 William G. McLoughlin 
described the impact of this wide-spread event:
The forces set in motion during the Awakening 
broke the undisputed power of religious establishments 
from Georgia to the District of Maine, but more than 
that, the Awakening constituted a watershed in the self- 
image and conceptualization of what it meant to be an 
American. The old assumptions about social order and 
authority that underlay colonial political economy and 
produced cultural cohesion dissolved. The corporate and 
hierarchical ideal of society began to yield to an 
individualistic and egalitarian one. While the
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medieval concept of a Christian commonwealth 
lingered, its social foundations crumbled.3
The historical sources describing the Great Awakening are very 
biased, for this was an issue which deeply divided the colonists. 
"One was either for it or opposed to it; almost no one— except, 
perhaps, Benjamin Franklin— remained indifferent."4
The major idea being suggested was that "God in America was 
working outside the accustomed forms."5 He was providing new 
ways to come to Him. It was here in the debating of what were 
appropriate means by which individuals could come to know God, 
that "the participants touched the crucial question of the use of 
Old World institutions, as well as the continuance of Old World 
customs in the New World."6 "Although the revival was not an 
explicitly political movement, it had profound political implica­
tions."7 For as this debate continued to expand, by the time of 
the Revolutionary War, it did, indeed, include social and 
political institutions, practices, and traditions as well.
One of the major personalities in the Awakening was an 
English traveling evangelist, George Whitefield, who carried the 
message from Philadelphia to New York and then all the way to 
Georgia and back. In total, he made four evangelistic tours of 
the colonies, the last one in 1770.6 As a traveling minister, he 
would preach in open fields and village squares, "lambasting the 
clergy of the mainline churches, calling them unconverted and 
strangers to Christ."® His message encouraged rank amateurs
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into the field, who challenged the need for a college education or 
for proper ordination in order to preach the Gospel, instead they 
insisted grace and faith were all that were needed.10 This had 
a leveling effect on privileged position, and was certainly a 
powerful democratic force. "Anyone could have his say. No single 
person, priest, class of people, or institution could be consider­
ed the sole oracle of truth.”11
David S. Lovejoy, in his review of original documents of the 
period, came to the conclusion that:
What many religious leaders actually did was to 
convince a large segment of the colonial population 
that not only was America different from the Old World, 
but religion itself was different in America. They held 
that a vital relationship demanded a "vital religion," 
and that a vital religion was an experimental religion 
which affected the hearts or emotions of the people.
In fact, the emotions or "affections" were a vehicle 
for the new religion. This was a radical breakthrough 
for the colonial clergy who participated, "for previously 
emotions had been carefully controlled, lest they be 
misdirected and lead to enthusiasm."12
A major outcome of this Awakening was the emergence of the 
layman as a central and dominant figure in the American Christian 
community. Upon experiencing a conversion, the person became 
changed and now was prepared to judge all people and all authority 
in terms of the presence of the Spirit. This heightened sense of 
the ability to make decisions gave individuals a greater degree of 
self-consciousness concerning their own position in society, 
allowing them to question everything that had previously been 
considered authority.13
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The new ability to question authority impacted the organized 
religious institutions forever in American society. From this 
point forward, no church, particularly those within the Protestant 
Christian sector, was ever again immune from being split into 
factions. The Presbyterian Church at the time split into two 
groups, Old Sides and New Sides; for the Congregationalists, there 
were the New Lights and Old Lights. And separating from these
were the Baptists. All were on "a quest for spiritual purity,
indeed for a more fervent and personal relationship with God" than 
was presently being offered by any of the existing organized 
churches.14 This constant searching for the "one true church" 
continued to impact the entire Protestant community to such a
point that by the time of the American Revolution, though the
religious composition of the nation was 98.4 percent Protestant, 
as many as 75 percent of that group are reported to have been 
dissenting congregations from whatever was the established church 
of the colony.15 All the dissenting churches "were stressing 
the individual's personal relationship with God, unbrokered by 
human institutions whether political or religious."16
The nation was inundated with this new, individual sovereign­
ty to seek and decide for one's self the correct way to serve God. 
This was clearly one of the major circumstances impacting how 
"religion" was being experienced throughout all thirteen colonies. 
The importance of it to the political organization of American 
society was not lost on the men who wrote the Constitution or sat
40
in the First Congress. But even with this widely-held recognition 
of individual sovereignty in regards to religious thought, a new 
development emerged during the Revolutionary War that could have 
impacted this new freedom, if it had ever become enforced on the 
national level.
This new development involved the manner in which some of the 
original states were dealing with religion. A good example is the 
Constitution written in 1778 for the state of South Carolina. 
Written five years before the end of the Revolutionary War, it has 
been called by one writer: "one of the most remarkable documents
in the protracted effort of the former English colonies, now by 
their own declaration independent, to straighten out their
religious life."17 This "remarkable document" had made
Protestant Christianity— not any one church or denomination, but
the entire group— the established religion of the state.
It did this by first declaring that only Protestants could 
sit in either of the two houses of the state legislature. "Then 
it put the point as forth-rightly as anyone could ask: 'The 
Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby 
constituted and declared to be, the established religion of the 
State.'"18 Thus, one of the new American States dealt with its 
own religious diversity by allowing the dominant group to define 
what the necessary, normative religious outlook must be in order 
to politically participate in the state government.
However, the ramification of this type of response to the
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majority religious outlook did not end with South Carolina. The 
state of Virginia was also trying to deal with its own religious 
communities. In 1779, one year after South Carolina had written 
its constitution, a select committee on religion of the Virginia 
House of Delegates not only looked at it as a model; they actually 
followed it almost word for word.1®
There were only two basic differences. First, they dropped 
the word "Protestant," for them it was simply the Christian 
religion that they wanted establish as Virginia's religion. 
Second, they added a general tax on all citizens for the support 
of all Christian ministers.20 This General Assessment Bill was 
then introduced to the State Legislature. In it, following the 
guidelines from South Carolina, a group could become a recognized 
established Church of this hoped for newly Established Christian 
Religion, by having any fifteen or more male persons, not under 
twenty-one years of age, unite to form a Christian religious body. 
By giving themselves a name, the group could then become a Church 
of the Established Religion of Virginia, thus allowing them to 
participate in the general tax for their group's minister's 
benefit.21
However, in Virginia, an alternative plan for dealing with 
its religious communities was introduced at the same time. In 
1779, Thomas Jefferson proposed, for the first time, his own Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom in the State of Virginia. 
There could not have been two more opposite views of how to
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deal with religion at the state level than these two. Peterson 
calls Jefferson's position "a root-and-branch rejection of 
any civic authority in matters of religion and an affirmation 
of complete freedom of belief and worship."22 But neither plan 
could command a majority of the General Assembly in 1779 or for 
several years thereafter. It was five years later in 1784, a 
time when Jefferson was in France, that the whole controversy 
resurfaced.
Of the two bills first introduced in 1779, now in 1784 (five 
years later) only the General Assessment Bill was discussed. 
Jefferson's bill for Establishing Religious Freedom was not even 
on the table and Jefferson was out of the country. James Madison 
became the leader of the opposition against the entire idea of a 
state established religion and for a tax on all the citizens to 
support it.
The assessment plan now had the title "A Bill 
for Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the 
Christian Religion," and it had the backing of 
churchmen— those friends of the longtime establish­
ment now reorganized as the Protestant Episcopal
Church The famed Hanover Presytery, which had
opposed a general tax, would cease to do so as long 
as the revenue was distributed fairly to all denomin­
ations But for their suspicion that the bill's
primary purpose was to prop up the Episcopalians, 
the Methodists, too, though never the Baptists, 
would have supported it. The bill made steady 
progress in the house. Madison waged a desperate 
delaying action. Finally, as the session drew to 
a close, he got the delegates to agree to postpone 
the vote on the bill until November of 1785.23
In the spring of 1785, Madison wrote his famous "Remonstrance
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Against Religious Assessments." Believing that if the bill became 
armed with the sanction of law it would be a dangerous abuse of 
power, Madison presented his argument. There were fifteen major 
elements to it. The one most relevant to this argument is summa­
rized in Madison's question: "Who does not see that the same
authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all 
other religions, may establish with the same ease any particular 
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other sects?"24 This 
document was then printed and distributed widely throughout the 
state. Madison reported in one of his letters that it had been 
"so extensively signed by the people of every religious 
denomination," that at the November session of the legislature the 
projected measure was completely abandoned.2®
The fact was, the General Assembly had received more than a 
hundred petitions on religion. "Only eleven supported the assess­
ment plan; many others, with some 11,000 signatures, were copies
of the Memorial and Remonstrance."26 Considering that five
years later the 1790 Official Census, which counted men, women, 
children and slaves, had determined the population of Virginia to 
be 69,200,27 11,000 signatures on the petitions must have repre­
sented an overwhelming percentage of the voting population. It 
was only after support for a plural establishment had completely 
disappeared, that James Madison reintroduced Jefferson's Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom. The bill passed easily and became 
law on January 16, 1786.
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And so, in the year 1785, three years after the end of the 
Revolutionary War and one year prior to the calling of the 
Constitutional Convention, the men of Virginia had taken a stand 
regarding their state's ability to dictate a singular, normative 
religious viewpoint for its citizens. They had clearly declared 
that it was not within its powers, passing legislation to confirm 
that fact for all time. This was becoming a recognized American 
conviction not only for men like Jefferson and Madison, two of the 
leading voices, but for the 11,000 others, who had signed the
petitions, and many others who, throughout this newly created
country, had followed the debate. Government could not take a 
position regarding what was the correct way to believe religiously 
that was a sphere of decision-making that belonged to the 
individual citizen alone. Theirs was a recognition that everyone 
has the right to seek their own religious outlook and this 
included the freedom to be wrong; there was no government power or 
authority to either promote or restrict in this regard.
This had become the religious climate of the new nation as
its leading citizens gathered in Philadelphia. How did they deal
with it? Was there any debate regarding religion or the practice 
of religious beliefs? The evidence on the deliberations show that 
they discussed neither religion nor churches. But concern about 
religious freedom did not go unnoticed, for it was acknowledged to 
be an extremely important individual freedom for many. Therefore, 
in Article VI, Clause 3, which deals with the requirement that
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all senators and representatives of both federal and state legis­
latures, plus all executive and judicial officers of all these 
governmental bodies:
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support 
this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever 
be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.
The choice of either "by oath or affirmation" can only be viewed
as a recognition of the needs of religious groups such as the
Quakers, who completely rejected taking oaths but willingly would
affirm their own behavior.20 But it was the final prohibition
that allowed many who would not have supported ratification of the
Constitution to do so. The prohibiting of the possibility that
there could ever be a required religious testing, in order to
participate in the federal government either as an elected officer
or an employee, did two things. First, it clearly showed that the
federal government would never declare a national religious
position, as some states were doing. Second, it allowed men, such
as Isaac Backus, to give their full support to ratification.
Isaac Backus was one of the most influential of the Baptist 
clergymen among the dissenting Baptists congregations, which were 
present throughout all of the newly proclaimed thirteen states. 
This prohibition of any type of religious test allowed him not 
only to support ratification of the Constitution in Massachusetts, 
but also to urge his fellow Baptists and other Dissenters to do 
likewise in other states.20 Therefore, the prohibition that 
was established in Article VI was no small thing. By its
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presence, the voices of the many concerned about religious 
freedom were gained in support of ratification. Remember, in 
Virginia alone, there were 11,000 such concerned men. By clearly 
denying the federal government an ability to require a religious 
test, the Constitution was able to gain support from this active 
segment of the population, the size of which allowed it not only 
to become ratified, but also to become accepted as the law of the 
land. This kind of understanding gives credence to the perception 
that in both recognizing and accepting the country's religious 
diversity, men of different religious persuasions had firmly come 
together to work on civic matters. Religious thinking and its 
accepted worth have clearly played a major role in the establish­
ment of our form of government.30
But even as the Constituiton was being ratified, there was 
grumbling among the people regarding the lack of a Bill of Rights. 
Therefore, when the first U.S. Congress convened on March 4, 1789, 
it immediately took under consideration amendments to the 
Constitution. Of the many that were submitted, Congress reduced 
them to twelve, which were submitted to the States. Two failed of 
ratification; the others became the first ten amendments. Known 
as the Bill of Rights, they were ratified on December 15, 1791, 
fifteen years after our Declaration of Independence.
It is in the First Amendment to the Constitution that the 
supposed call for a separation of church and state resides. These 
are the words of that amendment:
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establish­
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.
It is interesting how the first two phrases have come to be called 
the religious clauses and, therefore, have been separated from the 
remainder of the amendment, as if they were something different 
from the other freedoms. This separating has resulted from the 
incorporation of the idea that in some manner these clauses 
include a required separation of church and state. However, the 
evidence does not support such an incorporation. There was no 
concern at the federal level in regards to how to deal with the 
institution of churches. This was a concern that was delegated to 
the states.
Yet, as earlier shown, there was a concern about the possi­
bility that some day there might be a national call to establish 
Christianity as the nation's religion. It certainly was the 
normative, dominant religion of the people and it had been estab­
lished in several states. The people wanted it clearly declared 
that the new federal government did not have this particular 
authority or any other authority to interfere with a citizen's 
freedom to decide for him/herself what was the correct religious 
belief to hold.
This conclusion iB extremely important to accept, for upon it 
hangs much of this argument. If it is agreed that it was no 
oversight or mistake on the part of the writers' that they clearly
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used the word "religion" rather than "church," because they 
recognized the difference between the two, than the belief that 
the Constitution itself established a required separation between 
the institutions of church and state can be fundamentally 
questioned. By removing the incorporation of the word "church" 
from any reading of the First Amendment, its entire interpretation 
becomes involved with the concept of individual sovereignty and 
the removal of government control over it.
By acknowledging that religion resides in an area controlled 
totally by individual sovereignty, the purpose of the First 
Amendment can then be seen as an entire unit. Its purpose was to 
declare special areas of life completely outside the authority of 
government. It totally denies Congress the power or powers to 
establish any laws that would:
(a) establish a national religious belief system for all 
citizens31;
(b) prohibit the free exercise by individuals to decide 
for themselves what to believe religiously as being 
correct or true;
(c) abridge the freedom of an individual to say what he/she 
believed to be the truth;
(d) abridge the freedom of the press within the public 
community;
(e) abridge the right of the people to peacefully assemble; 
and
(f) abridge the right of the people to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.
The first three clauses are concerned with individual freedoms;
the last three deal with communal freedoms of the people. All six
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simply limit the use of government power against citizens, either 
as individuals or in a group. In addition, note that the three 
group or communal freedoms have nothing to do with churches, 
instead they point to areas of group communications (press, 
assembly, petition). By accepting this interpretation of the 
First Amendment, the idea of a required constitutional separation 
between the institutions of churches and government is removed, 
thus allowing for an entirely new discussion of legitimate ways 
that churches and the government might interact.
The Constitution established a new form of government, one 
which included new, revolutionary ideas regarding how government 
should work. First, the new federal government of this nation was 
a limited state. There were definitely some powers that it did 
not possess. One was that it could not disallow any citizen from 
participation in government due to religious beliefs. There could 
never be a religious test to define a person's ability to partici­
pate imposed. In addition, it could neither declare a national 
religious outlook for all the citizens to hold nor could it limit 
anyone'8 liberty to seek religious understanding or to hold a 
particular religious belief.
Second this meant that the federal government was to exercise 
its allowed powers and functions without having any authoritative
identification with God. This is the separation of government
from religion. The government's powers came solely from the 
people who had established it and who were willing to continue to
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live under its authority. This was a major change in the manner 
in which a society had traditionally been politically organized. 
Historically, governments had depended on the support of God in 
order to possess legitimate power to control the people. Within 
European history, the divine right of kings had always connected 
God with the government. And even within our own Colonial period, 
many believed that they were making a covenant with God as they 
established their own civic governing bodies.32 But this new 
government received its power and authority from the people and it 
was the people themselves who gave it the power to govern them. 
This new form of governing had come to acknowledge that God was 
not the authority authorizing its existence, that authority came 
directly from the people. The conclusion that Americans had come 
to accept was that they alone were responsible for governing 
themselves. But, this recognition in no way removed a need for 
God or for religious thinking from their individual lives.
This interpretation is upheld by others. Harold J. Berman in 
his essay, "Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern
State," noted that the framers of the American federal and state
constitutions chose at the federal level a new idea; not only did 
persons, individually and in groups, have the right to exercise 
their religion free of any restraint by government, but also
the duty of government was to exercise its powers and functions
without identification with the authority of God.33
This new understanding of the limited powers of government
51
held other elements. Fellman, in discussing the American concept 
of the limited state, pointed out that by accepting such an idea, 
an acknowledgment was made that "many important activities and 
interests of a complex society are outside its [the government's] 
scope."34 It is outside the sphere of direct government control 
that the religious system of our society exists. But this system 
exists along with the other major societal systems, i.e., the 
economic, social, and cultural. All of which interact with the 
political system and its institution of governments. The 
religious system, with its institution of churches, is no 
different in the organization of society than the economic system, 
with its institution of business enterprises. Government is 
limited in not being able to enter into business, as it is limited 
from offering religion. However, there is no Constitutional 
limitation on the government's ability to speak to either set of 
institutions.
With the establishment of the United States, a fuller reali­
zation of the many dimensions of societal life had become recog­
nized. Government's role in it was that of maintaining order and 
providing justice. Religion or religious thinking was the means 
that individual citizens were to use to decide how best to 
participate not only in it but in all the other dimensions of 
societal life. "(T)he fact that religion and government were to 
be free of each other's control was not understood to exclude 
their reciprocal influence on each other."35
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The question now becomes exactly how did this new understand­
ing of limited government and its removal from the supporting of 
churches actual unfold, for political independence had confronted 
the American churches with a whole cluster of new pressures.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RESPONSE OF AMERICAN CHURCHES 
TO A NEW ENVIRONMENT
Many of the first settlements in the American colonies were 
established by religious bodies, primarily different denominations 
of Protestant Christianity. Denominationalism has been explained 
to mean that there is no monopoly on the Christian faith, only a 
right to compete for adherents.1 As a result, there has never 
been a single, controlling church body on American soil; even 
during the colonial period with its established churches, 
dissenters to them were always present. The American environment 
has always been both challenging and competitive for churches and, 
after the establishment of the new government, this certainly did 
not change. In fact, it became more visible.
One of the initial challenges to the churches came directly 
from the theology of Protestant Christianity itself. By pursuing 
the religious thought that had initially started with the Reform­
ation, many American theologians had come to hold that it was each 
individual's responsibility to relate directly with God. There no 
longer was a need for intermediaries. For example, the Baptists, 
who formed independent, autonomous churches throughout all of the 
thirteen colonies and later throughout all of the states:
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prided themselves on their belief that the individual 
believer has a personal and dynamic relationship with 
God, one that does not need the intermediary of a 
clergy or a hierarchy or, least of all, an official
interpretation of Scripture Foremost among Baptist
convictions— the reason for so much of the dissent 
that has marked Baptist history— is the right of the 
individual to follow the dictates of his or her conscience, 
free from the oppression of an overaching authority, 
secular or ecclesiastical.2
If carried to its logical end, this understanding makes the organ­
ized church body no longer necessary for individuals to come to 
know God or to understand the right behavior desired by God. James 
Madison had declared, first and foremost in his famous argument 
against religious assessments, that:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and 
undeniable truth, "that religion or the duty which 
we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging 
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, 
not by force or violence." The religion, then, of 
every man must be left to the conviction and 
conscience of every man; and it is the right of 
every man to exercise it as these may dictate.3
The impact of this conviction that individuals have a duty, 
as well as an ability to decide, was causing major changes in the 
organization of society. Its influence on the form of government 
ultimately established in America was paramount. This recognised 
ability to seek and understand God was grounded in the belief that 
all persons had been given a conscience that could differentiate 
right from wrong. This is the foundation for trust in our 
democratic form of government. It is the idea that "We the 
People" will work together for the benefit not only of self and
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family, but also for all others. As Roger Williams had noted a 
century earlier, with the gift of conscience from God, individual 
citizens were now responsible for governing themselves together, 
in a right manner. No one was exempted from this duty of working 
for the right ordering of government.4
All of this was dynamic, revolutionary thinking, not just for 
government, but for churches and social relationships as well. It 
totally challenged accepted wisdoms of the day. First, it separ­
ated government from religion. The government of men was no 
longer dependent on having a religious element in order to have 
legitimacy. Government came into being from the desires of the 
people for just and equal laws and possessed only the powers given 
to it by the people. The reason that this would work was the 
widely-held belief, at that time, that all persons could come to 
know God and seek only right behavior. Second, the religious need 
of people was not dependent upon the sponsorship of government or 
a declared creed or dogma. Religion resided within each person in 
the form of conscience. It waB the source of wisdom to decide how 
to rightly and justly behave. It was an inner source of knowledge 
and could be experienced by all.
It was after this evolutionary and revolutionary religious 
thought had been been taken to all thirteen colonies by men such 
as George Whitefield during the Great Awakening, that the colonies 
entered their Revolutionary War with England. From this conflict, 
the colonies emerged independent with a new form of government.
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This new form on a national level declared religious freedom for 
all within its boundaries. But what effect did these political 
changes have on churches? Would the idea of liberating the 
churches from government power free them "from the contagious 
corruptions of worldly ambition" prove true?6
The Revolutionary War disrupted church life in a variety of 
ways. For the presently established churches, it ultimately meant 
disestablishment, a fact clearly acknowledged by history.
Between the Declaration of Independence in 1778 
and the inauguration of the Constitution in 1789 many 
states disestablished their churches and granted full 
or partial religious freedom within their boundaries.
The rest kept their establishment for varying periods 
of time.6
The last vestige of the established churches were the Congrega- 
tionalist churches of New England, which remained until finally 
disestablished in Connecticutt (1818) and in Massachusetts 
(1833).7
Of all the disestablished church bodies, the Angelican or 
Church of England in the Southern colonies had the greatest 
problem. They had to find a way out of the stigma of loyalism 
that was attached to their churches because of the earlier 
relationship to the Crown. It is from the Angelican or Church of 
England that is seen the first new American way of creating a 
church. From the one, two new churches actually emerged. The 
first came in 1784, when the Methodist segment completely reor­
ganized itself independent of the Church of England, as well as
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from the English Wesleyans, and created a totally new American 
denominational organization. Then in 1785, the Protestant 
Episcopal Church of the United States was organized. It followed 
more the established Angelican pattern of organization.8
Other major American church hierarchies (Congregationalists, 
Presbyterians, Baptists, Lutherans, and Quakers), though needing 
no independence from a European mother church, for none had ever 
existed, or they had already achieved it by the time of the 
Revolution, still "took advantage of the prevailing ferment of 
reorganization to reconstitute" themselves.® These additional 
church bodies, though having different concerns than the 
Angelicans, followed the accepted American pattern of attempting 
clear organizational design by writing for themselves a 
Constitution.
American ecclesiasticism, like the American 
political estate, stamped itself with the contract 
theory of government, with the doctrines of the 
separation of powers, and with the ideal of the 
consent of the governed.10
From this activity of the major churches it becomes apparent that 
they are only human-organized institutions, which as Roger 
Williams had pointed out "are made by man and are, as subject to 
rewriting as is any other contract."11
Another immediate challenge experienced by these groups was 
finding ground for their own authority, particularly the newly 
disestablished ones. "Forced to rely upon authority other than
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the seal of state approval, each body restated its raison d'etre 
in increasingly exclusive terms."12 However, along with giving 
the reasons for its own authority, the church administrations 
had to deal with the new American demand for more laity 
involvement within the organization of the church. The response 
given to this demand from the laity, which some of the churches 
were more inclined to meet than others, presented one of the first 
demonstrations of a church's responsiveness to a marketplace, for 
the type of response given later affected membership numbers.
Upon review of this behavior, it becomes apparent that the 
American environment, which was now provided by a new limited 
government with its provision for freedom of religion, was clearly 
producing a new major element within this society. This element 
consisted of the American churches, which were organizing them­
selves into becoming the representative of religion for the 
people. It was this organization that became the sales force for 
religion in the United States. Kelly Olds, in his article 
"Privatizing the Church," noted:
The disestablishment of the church in the United 
States has been the most significant privatization in 
American history. At no time, before or after, has any 
important economic sector so dominated by the government 
been turned over so completely to private enterprise.
Many scholars believe that the privatization of religion 
is one of the main reasons that the religious services 
sector in America is so much larger than that in 
Europe today.13
William Lee Miller concurred, stating that by "ending established
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churches in the states, the early American leaders deregulated the 
religion market."14
This deregulated market has extensive marketing opportunities 
for it deals not only with human emotions and desires, but with 
all of the ultimate questions regarding human existence and 
purpose. Religion is one of the basic components of human 
reality. But in its corporate form as an organised church, its 
market takes on the characteristics of a service industry. And as 
Olds states, "(t)he services provided by religious institutions 
are widely considered to possess externalities that affect (all) 
the social, economic, and political systems" of society.15 And 
in this new system of limited government, it had become accepted 
knowledge that government was no longer responsible for "many 
important activities and interests of a complex society."16 
Therefore, this new societal element, which contained the 
churches, became more than simply the representative of the 
religious system that was now separated from the political system. 
It encompassed much more, for it became part of other societal 
systems as well, particularly the social and the economic.
So the situation unfolds. Government is no longer in charge 
of the spiritual welfare of its citizens. Each citizen now holds 
that responsibility within his/her own sovereignty. And "(t)he 
church, the clergy, and Christian belief were all thrown out into 
the great sea of public discourse, to sink or swim altogether on 
their own, without any safety net whatsoever in the nation's
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fundamental law."17. But they were not "altogether," they were 
divided up into many different Denominations, all of which were in 
competition with one another for adherents. I will not deal with 
the consequences of the Protestant Denominations' contest within 
the American marketplace, that is simply outside the scope of this 
thesis. Instead, I want only to point out how corporate activity 
early influenced this sector of our society. It is here that our 
nation has failed to understand the difference between religion 
with its sovereignty given to the individual and religion repre­
sented by churches within their organized structures.
The corollary of religious freedom, as been 
suggested, is the voluntary church. Theologically 
the churches might still regard themselves as 
divinely constituted, but from a legal point of 
view they were no more than voluntary associations 
of private citizens. This voluntary status had 
revolutionary implications for the whole life and 
outlook of the churches.18
The idea that "religious freedom" is demonstrated in our soceity 
by the provision of "voluntary churches," i.e., churches that no 
one is required by law to attend, has created an additional major 
problem to the one I am trying to unravel. For this idea has 
helped to place churches outside of the law, by implying that they 
represent "the essence of religious freedom," which cannot be 
regulated. It is this assumption which has helped encourage the 
incorrect manner of interpreting the First Amendment. This 
current interpretation implies that this sector of our society, 
containing all organized religious bodies, is outside the super­
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vision of government because of the freedom of religion. The only 
means to discredit this interpretation regarding the status of 
churches is to look more fully at their behavior. Is there any 
reason to believe that the "churches" are "religion itself" and, 
therefore, possess their own sovereign freedom from government 
control?
Robert Wuthnow in discussing churches as organizations point­
ed out that all organizations exist in the first place to manage 
resources and to plan for uncertainty, in order to perpetuate 
their own existence.10 It is with these basic organizational 
concerns that the churches concentrated much of their activity at 
the end of the eighteenth- and into the early nineteenth-century. 
First, they declared their own independent existence by having a 
written constitution, which established their organizational 
system. They also included with it their own religious dogma as 
to what was the correct way to God. This was the authorization 
for their own divine formation, which they had to declare to 
justify their individual existence.
Second, they needed to establish a legal existence, in order 
to retain control over any assets that had been or would become 
the property of their body. Legal standing is an area controlled 
by the individual states. As a result, the churches turned to the 
state legislatures, concerned principally about property. First, 
would disestablishment mean that title to church property was to 
be returned to the public? It was unanimously decided by state
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legislatures that it did not.20 Second, how, then, should they 
hold title? Again help was offered by the state legislatures.
The American state legislatures, for their part, 
assisted the churches by passing laws for the protection 
of their property. At first they provided individual acts 
of incorporation in response to an application from any 
denomination, but by the 1860s all the states except Rhode 
Island and South Carolina had enacted general incorporation 
stautes. During the 1870s many states went further, and 
created different classes of general incorporation, one 
suitable for each of the leading types of denominational 
structure. These were especially satisfactory, since they 
recognized the differences of internal government in the 
various bodies. And in 1871, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in Watson v. Jones— a case arising out of 
a Presbyterian dispute in Kentucky— ruled that the 
obligations incurred by members of churches as a result 
of their internal rules and disciplines, and the judgments 
of church tribunals on their own members, should be 
upheld as law.21
This use of general incorporation statutes for religious con­
gregations implemented a governmental policy of denominational 
equality by offering the advantages of incorporation to all 
religious groups without discrimination.22 This was the first 
attempt to deal with an even hand among the church organizations. 
However, there were also controls applied. In the case of the 
state of New York:
Initially, a mortmain clause, limiting the amount 
of land a congregation could own was added to prevent 
the accumulation of real property in immobile corporate 
hands In order to enforce this policy, all congrega­
tions had to submit a triennial financial report to the
Chancellor or local judge The law became a dead letter
after 1798 and did not receive much attention until 1850, 
when the arrears of triennial reports were forgiven and 
further reports were required only from those congregations 
with annual investment incomes in excess of $6,000.23
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This concern regarding finances is frequently an area that is 
considered appropriate for government involvement. From this 
historical overview of the churches need for government authorisa­
tion to establish their independent existence, the idea that these 
institutions operate in an independent domain is shown to be 
false. The simple fact is churches need government to provide the 
means for them to establish their legal existence. This demon­
strates government's accepted authority by churches, at least in 
this area. Government did not need any authorization from the 
churches for this authority. This authority is given to it by the 
citizens of the state. In looking for the seats of authority in 
America, it always returns to authorization from the people. And 
for over the first one hundred years of our history, there was 
never any doubt that authorization to regulate church bodies had 
been given to the government by the people.
Third, they needed to financially provide for their own 
existence. Thus, at the very beginning of the disestablishment of 
churches and the removal of public financing, the clergy of the 
churches turned to developing new means for fund-raising. The 
initial three methods most commonly used were: auctioning off pews 
or permanent marketable rights to pews, having members make annual 
pledges to the church, and the development of the permanent fund 
from one-time gifts and large donations from weathy church 
members. It was "the permanent fund" that all churches sought to 
establish, so that they could continue to survive on the income it
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would generate.24 This was the fund that the New York state 
legislature wanted to be kept informed about.
At the same time, the organized religious element of American 
society wanted to increase its presence in society-at-large. The 
basic method used to do this was to organize voluntary societies. 
An advantage of the voluntary society was that they clearly pro­
vided "a means of bypassing denominational differences in the 
interest of united effort.''25 A definite benefit was that the 
societies circumvented the need to delay action until a majority 
within a church could be persuaded to act; for societies were 
defined in terms of purpose, not of creed. Their names explained 
their purpose: American Bible Society, American Sunday School
Union, and American Home Missionary Society.
John Mason Peck, a Baptist missionary to the city of St. 
Louis, made a suggestion in New York that changed the way these 
societies were used to religiously organize the new territories. 
In 1826, at an organizational meeting of the American Home 
Missionary Society, he suggested that:
(T)he missionaries of any one of the societies 
could easily act for them all, as he himself had been 
doing, thus multiplying their effectiveness. Each 
agent, as opportunity offered, could sell Bibles, 
distribute tracts, establish Sunday schools, organize 
churches, promote educational interest, and form local 
auxiliaries of each of the national societies, and in so 
doing, augment his income and solve the problem of 
support.26
The suggestion received immediate approval. Thus, the new
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religious sector created a national sales force with a well- 
organized distribution system for its merchandise.
In recognizing this nineteenth-century business activity in 
the religious sector, one can see that "religion" became only one 
of the elements of churches. It was the product being sold. One 
of the consequences of this type of behavior has been an internal 
division within many of the Protestant churches. This internal 
division results in two separate ruling structures that compete 
for control. Mark Chaves found in his 1993 study of Protestant 
Denominations that organizationally they have developed a dual 
structure, which consists of two parallel systems. They contain 
both a religious authority structure and an agency structure.27 
And in today's world, he discovered the agency structure worth 
fighting over. "It employs hundreds of people and has budgets in 
the tens of millions of dollars."28
There is also evidence that churches behave no differently 
than any other organization that compete with others in some sort 
of market environment. Verification of this opinion is offered by 
Robert Wuthnow in his 1994 book, Producing the Sacred: An Essav on 
Public Religion. Here he pointed out that church organizations 
share the same elements or process as any other human-created 
organization. Looking at three major characteristics shared by 
church organizations, he found that they simply did not differ 
from any other corporate entity:
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(1) Churches demonstrate selective adaptation, which 
is a market mechanism involved with competing for 
customers. They mark themselves off as different, 
offering something exclusive or unique.
(2) They show isomorphism, the coming to resemble one 
another in form and substance, which helps identify 
self with a set and signals conformity with larger 
norms.
(3) And they have specialization, which is the opposite 
of isomorphism and can be a source of cooperation, 
minimizing competition to some extent.29
Questions continue to remain: Exactly where do churches fit
into American society? Do they represent the entire religious 
sector of our societal life? Do they represent major players in 
the American economy? How are they different from other business 
enterprises? And how would arriving at answers to this type of 
questioning affect the present interpretation of the First 
Amendment?
A major area that illusrates how differently churches are 
treated by government, compared to other business groups, is seen 
in the taxation system of the nation. Perhaps here new under­
standings, as well as possibilities, might develop. This leds 
into the next chapter dealing with churches, tax exemption and 
their role in society.
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CHAPTER V
THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF CHURCHES
In seeking to provide financially for their organizations, 
the church bodies continued to expect the previous tax-exempt 
status to be applied to their properties. Within the history of 
the American colonies, there has been a consistent granting of tax
exemption to church property.1 This is not surprising, for as
Robert T. Miller and Ronald B. Flowers noted in their discussion 
of Tax Exemption to Religious Institutions:
Tax exemption for religious institutions and 
leaders is an ancient and virtually universal concept, 
nearly always to be found wherever an establishment of 
religion has existed. Consequently, tax exemption for 
the established church was found in all but a few of the 
early American colonies. When the First Amendment was
ratified, most states continued to grant tax exemption
to religious institutions.2
This continued tax exemption was now offered to all churches. 
Again upholding the idea of government fairness by offering equal 
treatment to all.
A major justification for this practice at the time was the 
belief that churches performed a valuable service to the community 
in promoting a moral ideology so necessary for a stable society.3 
In one citation, it was noted that:
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They have internal structures of authority to 
punish parishioners guilty of immorality. Such moral 
discipline is "probably of as much value to society, 
in keeping the peace and preserving the rights of 
property, as the most elaborate and expensive police 
system..Churches foster democratic principles and 
practices. They inspire citizens to vote for candidates 
and to participate in the political process.4
It is from this ground that we see the historical American accept­
ance of a belief that churches deserve to be tax exempt. In fact, 
Leo Pfeffer has asserted, that church immunity from taxation is in 
the nature of a universal value.5
At the same time, there was a further reinforcing of the idea 
that churches ought to be exempt from taxation. It came from a 
statement first articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in 
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) that the power to tax includes the 
power to destroy. This idea has led many to believe that to honor 
the concept of separation of church and state, it demands that 
churches be held tax exempt, as a form of protection for them.6
It was probably to this belief, that Chief Justice Burger was 
referring when in the Supreme Court's decision for Walz v. Tax 
CommiflRlnn (1970), he established a new test in regard to taxes 
and churches.
But then the Chief Justice went on to introduce 
a new test of his own: to escape the interdict of the
establishment clause, a law must not produce "an 
excessive government entanglement with religion." 
Exemption of the churches from taxation, Burger found, 
"occasions some degree of involvement with religion." 
But "elimination of exemption would tend to expand the 
involvement of government" by creating the relationship 
of tax collector to taxpayer. Exemption, therefore, 
passes the test.7
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It is because of these two developments, (1) a historical 
custom that believes churches deserve to be tax exempt because of 
the benefits they offer society and (2) a desire by the judicial 
branch of our government to occasion as few entanglements with 
religion as possible for government as a whole, that the churches' 
tax exemption is accepted as vital for the right ordering of our 
society.
However, both of these reasons have created another problem, 
particularly since the Walz decision. Ever since it was given, 
Reichley reported, some church representatives, such as Dean 
Kelley, director of the Commission on Religious Liberty of the 
National Council of Churches, have continued to argue that "the 
legislature cannot constitutionally tax churches."8 Again, the 
barrier of the present interpretation stands in the way of full 
discussion. For, by insisting "cannot," implies there is no 
authority to do so, making it extremely difficult to change what 
appears to be only an accepted tradition. If this were held to be 
true, that government has no authority to do so, churches would 
definitely be in a completely autonomous sphere of our society 
separated from government authority.
Exactly what are the areas of taxation from which churches 
are exempt? Basically, they are exempt from all taxes, plus being 
able to receive tax deductible contributions from donors. There 
are a total of five areas of taxation involved. The first two 
involve tax payment at the local and state level. At the local
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level, they are given exemption from the payment of property taxes 
on both land and buildings they own. This was the exemption that 
the Supreme Court upheld in its decision of Walz v. Tax Commission 
of the Citv of Hew York, decided May 4, 1970. It is also the area 
that has been traditionally exempt in this country. The second 
area is the exemption from payment of state sales tax. This 
exemption has arisen out of the fact that churches have been 
included in the group known as the charitable sector of our 
society, i.e., groups which have been identified as 501(c)(3) 
organizations by the Internal Revenue Service.
The third area is the exemption from paying any form of
income tax. It comes from the inclusion of churches in the large
group of organizations which have become known as the nonprofit 
sector. The IRS identifies these organizations in Section 501 of 
the Internal Revenue Code. There are many types of organizations 
within our society that are listed in Section 501 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. All of them are exempted from paying income tax. 
Yet, all, except churches, are required to file an informational 
tax return, Form 990, every year with the IRS, so there is 
communication between the government and the organization on an 
annual basis regarding its purpose, activities, and the areas in 
which funds are spent. This exception from any kind of financial
reporting to a public authority is one of the most unique
privileges given to churches.
The total 501 nonprofit sector includes such diverse groups
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as: real estate boards, business leagues, chambers of commerce; 
social clubs operated for pleasure, recreation and other nonprofit 
purposes; local teacher retirement fund associations; and instru­
mentalities of the United States organized by act of Congress and 
tax exempt by such act (examples would be Federal Reserve Banks, 
the National Farm Loan Association, Public Housing Administra­
tions). The section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code lists some 
twenty-six different purposes for organizations recognized by the 
Federal Government as exempt from paying income taxes, because 
they are nonprofit.
Churches are included as one of these nonprofit organiza­
tions. However, they are not singled out into a single separate 
category. Instead, they have been incorporated into the Section 
501(c)(3). This section exempts a special sub-set of nonprofit 
groups, which are regarded as our nation's charitable sector. 
This charitable sector holds all the organizations that are 
considered to be benevolent in character. They are identified by 
the nature of their activities, which are described as religious, 
educational, scientific, and cultural. This ruling refers back to 
the 1601 Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses. The inclusion of 
religion was part of the wisdom of that day. In 1601, as earlier
pointed out, it was believed that religion, in the form of the 
church, brought social stability to society, which was a benev­
olent act. This inclusion in Section 501(c)(3) gives churches a 
fourth area of tax advantage. It is only organizations declared
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by the IRS to have 501(c)(3) classification, that donations given 
to them may, then, be deducted on the donor's own tax return.
Here the situation becomes more complex, because of several 
additional questions and their apparent answers. What are the 
factors that have created, as well as justified, the existence of 
nonprofit organizations? What justifies placing churches into 
this sub-set of the economy, i.e., as nonprofit organizations? 
Do all the activities of churches meet the description of being 
benevolent in character, thus validating their designation as 
501(c)(3) organizations? (Being "benevolent" requires doing good 
for all, having no discriminating elements as regards to race, 
gender, or religion.) Are churches treated the same as every 
other group within the designation of 501(c)(3)? Or are they 
given special or different treatment? If the treatment is
different, what justifies the differences?
First, what are the reasons given to justify an entire sector 
of the economy being labeled nonprofit? It is an area that has
required its own rationale for existence. E.C. Lasbrooke, Jr., in
his book, Tax Exempt Organizations, attempted to explain the
underlying rationale for tax exemption given to groups declared 
nonprofit. His goal was to find the common thread running through 
this patchwork of nonprofit organizational groups, if indeed there 
is such a thread. One major idea used to explain this phenomenon 
is that since this group of organizations cannot reasonably be 
expected to generate meaningful income and that the purpose of the
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tax code is to provide a set of rules whereby the gains or profits 
generated by businesses are determined and taxed, they are removed 
from the taxable universe as inappropriate objects for taxation. 
This results in their identification as not-for-profit or 
nonprofit entities.®
This idea's explanation has generated the tax-base rationale. 
It explains the nonprofit sector by declaring that not all the 
entities within a society are taxed because of the fact that all 
taxes inevitable exempt someone or something. Boris I. Bittker 
argued that:
There is no way to tax everything; a legislative 
body, no matter how avid for revenue, can do no more 
than pick out from the universe of people, entities, 
and events over which it has jurisdiction those that, 
in its view, are appropriate objects of taxation.10
This inability to tax everything results in the acceptance that 
some entities that do make profits are not taxed, for none of the 
essential characteristics of being labeled a nonprofit enterprise 
require that it not make a profit. The only restriction is that 
all are barred from distributing any of their net earnings or 
profit to individuals who exercise control over them, such as 
members, officers, directors, or trustees.
It should be noted that a nonprofit organization 
is not barred from earning a profit. Many nonprofits 
in fact consistently show an annual accounting surplus.
It is only the distribution of the profits that is 
prohibited. Net earnings, if any, must be retained and 
devoted in their entirety to financing further produc­
tion of the services that the organization was formed 
to provide.11
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This information is confirmed by another citation. Non-profits, 
charitable or otherwise, are not subject to some constraints that 
are commonly believed to exist. "Most notably, they are not 
restricted in the amount of profit they may make; restrictions 
apply only to what they may do with the profits."12 All they 
are required to do is use the additional funds to purchase more 
resources for the organization, in order to achieve its purpose.
But, how does this coordinate with the tax-base rationale 
that is used to justify the existence of nonprofits? This ration­
ale contends that nonprofit organizations are not taxed and cannot 
be included in the tax base because they are not felt capable of 
earning a profit. Dean M. Kelley cited an article written by 
Boris I. Bittker titled, "The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations 
from Federal Income Taxation," which appeared in the Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 85 (1976). In it Bittker stated:
The exemption of nonprofit organizations from 
federal income taxation is neither a special privilege 
nor a hidden subsidy. Rather, it reflects that applica­
tion of established principles of income taxation to 
organizations which, unlike the typical business corpor­
ation, do not seek profit.13
However, can it be said that churches as corporations do not seek 
profit? Kelley points out that "charitable organization do not 
constitute consumption or wealth accumulation."14 Yet, it was 
early recognized in our history that churches wanted to develop 
permanent funds in order to guarantee their own continuing exis­
tence, by having enough capital in a permanent fundin order to
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live off of its interest.15
There exists a second rationale for this idea of nonprofit 
groups. In trying to explain why nonprofit organisations are 
given tax exempt status, Congress began in 1939 to base tax 
exemption on a public welfare theory. The theory holds that tax 
exempt organizations perform services that the government would 
otherwise have to perform in their absence. Therefore, any loss 
of revenue resulting from tax exemption is more than offset by 
shifting the financial burden for providing those services from 
the federal treasury to the tax exempt organizations.16
This theory of tax exemption is generally explained on the 
base of quid pro quo or tax-expenditure rationale: the exemptee 
(hospital, library, school, etc.) relieves the state of a 
financial burden it would otherwise bear, and in return the state 
relieves it of tax liability. But this cannot be true for 
churches. If the church did not provide religious worship, the 
state would not and could not constitutionally do so; even Leo 
Pfeffer asserted, there can be no quid for the quo here.17 And 
Dean M. Kelley concured with that statement.18
Moving past the rationales for nonprofits and returning to 
facts, are churches treated any different in the 501(c)(3) class 
than any other agency. The answer is a definite "yes." First, 
churches are not required to file an application for such a status 
with the government, as all other agencies are. This is considered 
to be a unique benefit given only to churches.19 The application
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requires an explanation of the purpose and activities of the 
organization. The objective is to discern whether the organiza­
tion does meet the criteria of having a charitable purpose. But 
at Congressional hearings in 1987, which dealt primarily with the 
financial dealings of television ministries, there was concern 
voiced regarding this lack of requirement for churches.
During the hearings, the commissioner and his 
aides pointed to the severe limits on the ability of 
of the IRS to monitor churches, particularly the lack 
of any requirement for them to 'seek an initial deter­
mination of tax-exempt status. Testimony was presented 
suggesting that certain religious organizations should 
be subjected to expanded reporting requirements. Several 
church representatives indicated agreement, but others 
raised objections on constitutional grounds. The general 
sense of the hearings was that a number of members of 
Congress would be willing to reconsider the propriety of 
the current broad exemption of religious organizations 
from the regulatory process.20
Nevertheless, even though not required, many do apply for the 
status in order to assure their contributors of the deductibility 
of their donations and to more easily obtain special mailing rates 
which are offered to nonprofits.21 That these donations are a 
very meaningful source of income for churches is validated by 
simply recognizing that "churches are the largest single part of 
the social sector in the United States, receiving almost half the 
money given to charitable institutions."22
Another unique special handling of churches, as 501(c)(3) 
organizations, is that Congress has mandated that they are exempt 
from filing Form 990, as earlier noted. Form 990 is an annual
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information return required of all tax exempt organisations 
that have Section 501 designation. It asks for information in 
nine basic areas.
Part I requires a Summary of Revenue, Expenses and Changes in 
Net Assets or Fund Balances. Part II is a Statement of Functional 
Expenses. It shows the percentage of funds spent in three major 
areas of activity of the organization, i.e., program expenses, 
cost of management and fundraising expenditures. Part III is a 
Statement of Program Service Accomplishments. Part IV asks for 
the Balance Sheets for the beginning of the year and the ending. 
Part V requires a List of Officials, Directors, Trustees and Key 
Employees. Part VI consists of several yes/no questions, while 
Part VII asks for an Analysis of Income-Producing Activities. 
Part VIII wants an explanation of the Relationship of Activities 
to the Accomplishment of Exempt Purposes and Part IX wants 
Information Regarding Taxable Subsidiaries. The purpose of this 
required reporting is to provide visible disclosure of activities 
to a public authority, thus creating a means to hold an organiza­
tion accountable to its stated goals.
This type of reporting became mandatory for all 501 organi­
zations in 1958, but churches have always been held exempt from 
compliance. "In 1969, the U.S. Senate continued the exemption of 
churches from filing information returns 'in view of the tradi­
tional separation of church and state'."23 Vaino cites the 
Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Reform Act
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of 1969, Compilation of Decisions Reached in Executive Session 53 
(Comm. Print 1969) as her source.24 This ruling is currently 
upheld by Revenue Procedure 86-23, 1986-1, Section 6033 (a)(2)(A), 
which provides certain mandatory exception from the filing 
requirement of Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax. There are three mandatory exceptions given in this section 
of the Code and they are the only ones given to any organization. 
It reads as follows:
(2) Exceptions from filing—
(A) Mandatory exceptions. — Paragraph (1) shall 
not apply to —
(i) churches, their integrated auxiliaries, 
and conventions or associations of 
churches
(ii) any organization (other than a private 
foundation, as defined in section 509(a) 
described in subparagraph (C), the gross 
receipts of which in each taxable year 
are normally not more than $5000, or
(iii) the exclusively religious activities of 
any religious order.20
A fifth area of exemption is also completely unique to 
churches. Form 8274 allows churches to elect exemption from both 
paying the employer's share of Social Security and Medicare taxes 
and submitting the employee's contribution to the IRS. Simply by 
filing two copies of this form certifying that the church is 
"opposed for religious reasons to the payment of Social Security 
and Medicare taxes," it "may elect exemption from the payment of 
the employer's share of these taxes by filing Form 8274."2B 
But this does not mean that the employer's share goes unpaid.
84
Instead, the employees themselves are held responsible for 
paying this 7.65% share, plus their own contribution of 7.65%, by 
having to file Schedule SE with their own individual federal tax 
return.
Employees (except ministers of a church or 
members of religious orders) who receive wages of 
$108.28 or more in a year from an electing church 
or qualified church-controlled organisation are 
subject to self-employment tax on earnings. They 
will be considered employees for all other purposes 
of the Internal Revenue Code, including income tax 
withholding.27
The reason for the exception of Ministers and members of religious 
orders is that "this election does not apply to the services as 
ministers of a church, members of a religious order," according to 
Form 8274.28 (The bold letters are on the form.) The result of 
this is that the churches that make this election still pay these 
taxes for the ministers, but not for the choir director or for the 
custodian.
From this information, it can clearly be seen that churches 
receive many special, unique considerations in the area of tax­
ation. The Congress has placed them into the sector of nonprofit 
organizations, plus allowed them to automatically be listed in the 
special 501(c)(3) sub-set without having to apply. Churches are 
exempt from reporting any financial information to public 
authority. They pay no taxes to any government level. Locally, 
they are exempt from property taxes. At the state level, they are 
exempt from paying both sales tax and income tax. Nationally,
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they are exempt from paying income tax. In addition, they can 
elect to not pay Social Security and Medicare taxes for many of 
their employees by simply citing religious reasons. Recognizing 
this information, one sees how totally different churches are 
treated than all other nonprofit organisations. They definitely 
do appear to reside outside of government authority, whether there 
is a constitutional restriction that requires such distancing or 
not.
However some churches show a discomfort with their inclusion 
in the 501(c)(3) classification, since they are held to the same 
criteria for eligibility. What does it mean to be held to the 
same eligibility criteria? This criteria has four conditions that 
are written in the language of restrictions listed in the section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A common way of describ­
ing them is: (1) the organization is organized and operated
"exclusively" for nonprofit purposes; (2) no net earnings inure to 
the benefit of private parties; (3) no "substantial" part of the 
organization's activities are devoted to attempts to influence 
legislation; and (4) "participation” or "intervention" in politi­
cal campaigns on behalf of candidates is prohibited.2®
The first two restrictions really have little impact on 
churches. They appear to firmly believe that they are organised 
and operate "exclusively" for charitable, benevolent purposes. 
The second restriction limiting distribution of earnings does not 
limit their ability to accumulate, as already noted. And they are
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completely exempt from being held to any financial accountability 
for their actions, outside of their own organization.
It is the last two conditions required for 501(c)(3) status 
that concern many present-day religious leaders. Derek Davis 
asserted that these last two requirements, "commonly called the 
'lobbying' clause (enacted in 1934) and the 'electioneering' 
clause (enacted in 1954)" limit the possible political activity of 
churches and, therefore, have created serious, and yet unresolved 
constitutional questions.30 James E. Wood, Jr. maintained that 
any attempt to regulate religious groups' abilities to lobby has 
"a seriously inhibiting effect on their work and witness in public 
affairs."31 To clarify the extent of this inhibiting effect, he 
addresses some basic questions:
Does government have the right to restrict the 
work and witness of those religious bodies which are 
involved in public affairs from speaking out on public 
policy issues and defending human values according to 
the insights of their own religious traditions?
If the involvement of religious groups in public 
affairs is regarded by them as integral to their faith 
and mission, is this role of religion not integral to 
their "free exercise of religion?"
Should not the prophetic role of religion in public 
places be recognized as essential not only to a free 
church but also to a free society?32
But apart from debates about the constitutionality or wisdom of 
the 501(c)(3) restrictions placed on the political activity of 
churches, there are two other major issues that have plagued the 
analysis and implementation of them upon churches, according to 
religious leaders.
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First, regarding the lobbying clause, there is 
little clarity as to when an organization has jeopar­
dized its tax exemption by engaging in "substantial" 
lobbying. The acceptable percentage of a organization's 
total expenditures spent for lobbying seems to fall 
somewhere in a range between 5 percent to 20 percent, 
but the lack of a standard method of measurement causes 
ongoing concern for all organizations engaged in legis­
lative activities. Second, regarding the electioneering 
clause, it remains uncertain as to when an organization 
has "participated" or "intervened" in a political campaign, 
an event that also triggers the loss of an organisation's 
tax exemption.33
Remember, it is the ability to receive tax-deductible contribu­
tions that the churches are concerned about here. It represents a 
major part of their income and the loss of the 501(c)(3) classi­
fication, they believe, would curtail such giving greatly. Yet, 
it does not make much sense to place them into a category and then 
exempt them from all the requirements that determine placement in 
that category (application and annual reporting of information), 
while simultaneously applying restrictions that could result in 
loss of their position there.
Looking at these findings clearly exposes the need to provide 
another way to handle churches and their tax exempt status. There 
is a confusion created by placing churches into this classifica­
tion of 501(c)(3) organizations and then exempt them from all 
requirements imposed on those in the classification. Our society 
clearly needs to review this rationale. Perhaps a new category 
for churches alone needs to be defined. By seeking such a redefi­
nition of church tax exempt status within the Internal Revenue 
Code, a whole host of important areas needing clarification would
88
become visible.
This would move the debate closer to the conclusion Derek 
Davis arrived at in his essay, "The Supreme Court, Public Policy, 
and the Advocacy Rights of Churches," published in 1991:
In light of these facts, it is best in these days 
for the churches to look upon the section 501(c)(3) 
restrictions as a fair price to pay for the benefits of 
tax exemption and deductibility of the contributions they 
receive Most violations of the restrictions are over­
looked entirely. The churches will do well to familiarize 
themselves with the section 501(c)(3) restrictions, the 
restictions and rulings issued pursuant thereto, and the 
court decisions interpreting this growing body of law. A 
recognition of the parameters of lawful advocacy will make 
the political involvement of the churches more effective and 
more respected. Where the parameters are still unclear, 
churches need to act prudently in the light of their 
religious obligations and their duty to uphold the law. 
Government's part is to sort through the panoply of policy 
considerations and chart a course that both serves the 
interest of democratic government and protects the right 
of churches to the free exercise of their religious 
mission.34
I totally agree with Davis. "Government's part is to sort 
through the panoply of policy considerations and chart a course 
that both serves the interest of democratic government and 
protects the right of churches to the free exercise of their 
religious mission." But there is also a need to sort through the 
covering that has been provided by traditional words and behavior.
A clear way to begin this sorting could be simply giving 
churches their own separate classification within the IRS Code.
This classification could clarify many nebulous features of the 
present relationship of churches to the tax system, perhaps to the
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total economy. There could be some illuminating questions and 
concerns addressed by this kind of redefining of the tax relation­
ship between church and state, for currently a relationship 
clearly exists, whether tax dollars or accountability are part of 
it or not.
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CHAPTER VI
A NEW CONFIGURATION FOR CHURCH/STATE INTERACTION
In any discussion of church/state interaction in America, it 
should not be portrayed as if all contacts are controversial. 
There is a substantial consensus on many subjects which should not 
be ignored or minimized. Yet, it is fully recognized that many of 
the "issues involving government and religion are among the most 
contentious confronting us as a nation."1 In seeking to more 
fully understand the reasons for this contention, I observed that 
a major element comes directly from the dominating, traditional 
way of interpreting the First Amendment. This interpretation 
maintains that, within what are called its religious clauses, 
there exists not only the provision for personal religious 
freedom, but also a requirement for "the separation of church and 
state."2 It is this traditionally-held requirement that causes 
discord, for there is no agreement as to the form this assumed 
"separation" is to take. This disruptive element has taken on the 
characteristics of a device or maneuver to derail discussion from 
areas that need clarification, but are filled with too many vested 
and diversified interests to allow for full deliberation.
Simply by citing this supposed First Amendment requirement or 
suggesting that constitutional concerns exist in a particular
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problem area, the conversation becomes automatically limited to 
dealing with this assumed constitutional requirement before any 
other substantial matters regarding the present difficulty can be 
defined, reviewed, discussed and, hopefully, resolved. An impor­
tant component in this maneuver is that neither side, church or 
state, is seen to have the needed authority for directing the 
necessary decision-making process. Thus, the entire matter 
becomes a part of an ever increasing quagmire.
An example of this is shown in the quote regarding the 1987 
Congressional hearings held on the financial dealings of televi­
sion ministries, presented on page 81. Though several church 
representatives indicated agreement with the suggestion that 
expanded reporting requirements would be appropriate, "others 
raised objections on constitutional grounds."3 When this type 
of objection is raised, i.e., the citing of possible inability or 
inappropriateness due to constitutional grounds, no evidence is 
required. Instead, one of the theories regarding the necessary 
elements of this "separation" is given as both the evidence and 
the authority.4 However, by citing a theory, the discussion 
moves from the present concern back to a discussion of the meaning 
of "the separation of church and state." This is truly circular 
reasoning with no end in sight. I have concluded that only by 
removing this traditional view, which places a "constitutional 
barrier" in front of unclear encounters between our churches and 
governments, can any clarity be achieved in determining legitimate
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interactions between the two systems and their institutions.
In order to validate this removal, I sought evidence that 
would clearly show that the Constitution is not referring to the 
institutions of churches in any way, and that it clearly does not 
limit the federal government or any other level of government from 
interacting with churches on issues that have been established to 
be the province of government, i.e., the areas in our societal 
life where government is recognized as the authority with 
decision-making power.
The first step taken was to explain the impact that this 
tradition has actually had on church/state interaction in today's 
environment. Here, it was shown that a political environment had 
been created in which government is reluctant to speak directly to 
the churches, even to the point of not defining such words as 
church, religion or religious, though using them extensively in 
legislation and court cases. This lack of definition has com­
pounded the confusion surrounding what might be appropriate 
interaction, for it provides no boundaries for any discussion.
The fact is, that in seeking to show that the government is 
honoring this assumed constitutional requirement for separation, 
it has clearly maintained a hands-off approach toward churches. 
This is demonstrated fully by looking at the way the federal tax 
system, through the IRS Code, deals with churches and their 
financial activities. By a review of the manner in which churches 
are dealt with, one sees that they have been granted tax exemption
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from virtually all taxes, and are given the ability to accept tax 
deductible contributions, plus they are exempted from having to do 
any kind of financial reporting. Since taxation and the ability 
to require fiscal reporting is clearly an accepted province of 
government, churches have certainly been placed into a separate 
and independent sphere outside the normal boundaries of government 
jurisdiction.
The result of this "separation" is the impression that 
churches exist in their own sphere of sovereignty within American 
society. By comprehending the impact of this belief and realizing 
that it is the root of many current problems between religion and 
government, the need is to move beyond it. The method used to 
accomplish this consisted of seeking a clearer understanding of 
the roots of the new thinking which had established totally new 
relationships between individuals, churches and the government in 
American society. It was not just knowledge of the forces that 
had ultimately removed government support for churches or the 
forces that had developed a new form of a limited government that 
was sought. Rather, it was knowledge of the actual ground from 
which these ideas had originated and grown, plus proof that they 
had become accepted within a major portion of society, that was 
needed.
Therefore the next step in the research was to review 
historical information regarding the American development of a new 
way to organize the relationships of the systems of a society.
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Realizing that the writing of the Constitution was only the 
culmination of developed thought, the need was to locate the key 
elements from which these understandings had emerged.
The primary elements had developed during the Colonial 
period, principally through the thinking that had been brought by 
dissenting Protestant groups to the colonies and expanded upon in 
the new American milieu. Men such as Roger Williams had arrived 
at a totally new understanding for the ordering of a society. 
They had come to hold that sovereignty resided within each indi­
vidual. It was individuals, together, who authorised governments 
and it was individuals, alone, who were responsible for their own 
personal relationship to God, the Creator. This new ordering in 
the society required an entirely new understanding regarding the 
relationship and interaction between two of its historically most 
powerful institutions: the church and the state. For, in the new 
American Thought, individuals had become the ultimate holders of 
control over both churches and government. In this new under­
standing, each person held individual sovereignty over their own 
religious life as well as their own political life. Within the 
political system of society, all needed to work together for 
justice and peace, the goal being the good or betterment of all. 
Within religious life, each person was individually free to seek 
hisAer own relationship with God and individually responsible for 
doing so.
Thus, by the time the Constitution was written, there was a
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majority consensus that government was no longer responsible for 
religion or its institution, the churches. Since individuals were 
responsible for their own religion, they were also responsible for 
their own churches. Churches were seen only as corporate entities 
or associations of individuals. Thomas Paine wrote:
I do not believe in the creed professed by the 
Jewish church, by the Roman church, by the Greek 
church, by the Turkish church, by the Protestant 
church, nor by any church that I know of. My own 
mind is my own church.5
There was nothing divine about churches themselves, they were 
simply institutions that existed within the confines of human- 
created society. Therefore, it was not churches, but "religion" 
in its totality that was discussed.
(I)n the extensive public discussions that were 
carried on in the late eighteenth and early ninteenth 
centuries concerning the religious liberty clauses of 
both the federal and the state constitutions, reference 
was rarely made to relations between church and state, 
debate centered, rather, on the extent to which "religion” 
and "government" should be free from each other's control.6
This continuing concern for the separation of religion from the 
control of government is illustrated by the action of the men of 
Virginia in 1785. They rejected the idea that government had any 
authority to define a singular, normative religious viewpoint for 
all its citizens, even though the suggested viewpoint was held by 
a majority of them.
It was also a reaction to this concern, that the Constitution
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clearly states that nationally there could never be a required 
religious testing in order to participate in the federal govern­
ment either as an elected official or as an employee. And by 
including religious liberty in the First Amendment, the people 
required the federal government to reiterate that it would neither 
declare a national religious outlook nor limit any individual's 
liberty to seek religious understanding or hold a particular 
religious belief.
Never in the research was there found any indication that the 
people, in placing limitations on the federal government in regard 
to religion, had limited its ability to have authorized authority 
over the institution of churches. It was publicly acknowledged 
that churches were established by groups, who wrote constitutions 
for themselves and became incorporated under state government 
guidelines. These churches competed, as well as worked together, 
with one another in the new religious marketplace. They were 
clearly human-created institutions.
What the Constitution of the United States clearly did was 
establish the totally new idea of a limited form of government. A 
major element of this idea is the recognition that "many important 
activities and interests of a complex society are outside its [the 
government's] scope. The state, with us, is neither omnicompetent 
nor omniscient.'"7 This limited government placed the religious 
system with its churches outside the sphere of its direct control. 
It exists along with the other societal systems that are also not
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directly controlled by government, i.e., the economic, the social, 
and the cultural. The religious system with its churches is no 
different than the economic system with its businesses. Government 
is not to enter into business or curtail the types of businesses 
that are conceived and founded by the citizens. However, govern­
ment does have authority to protect, control and tax businesses 
for the well-being of society.
There is no reason to believe that the same governmental
powers do not exist in regards to the religious sector with its
churches. Government is not to establish a prescribed religious
viewpoint for citizens to hold and it cannot limit individual
religious ideas. But that does not mean that it has no authority 
in regards to dealing directly with the institutions of churches, 
for the well-being of society. The conclusion of this research is 
that the present belief that the First Amendment requires some 
sort of specific "separation between church and state" is in 
error, and must be discarded. Instead, recognition is given to 
the realization that religious liberty does not equate to freedom 
of the churches from public authority. This certainly does not 
remove the restrictions that the Constitution has clearly placed 
on government in regards to religion. However, it does open new 
avenues for dialogue in many different arenas. No longer will 
there be "the wall" to hid behind, which stops discussion of 
possible interaction by imposing a barrier that must first be 
surmounted.
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Let's assume that this conclusion is accepted. There no 
longer is an implied constitutional barrier that stands in front 
of any interaction, requiring first an answer to the question: 
how is the “separation between church and state" being satisfied? 
What might the new configuration of church/state interaction look 
like? There is now a full recognition of the authority of govern­
ment in the area of accountability to society by all the spheres 
of societal life. There is also the recognition that churches are 
the corporate participants from the religious sphere of societal 
life. They visibly represent one of the major societal systems, 
the one which deals with the ultimate questions of life, of human 
existence.8 How can churches and government now legitimately 
interact with one another?
An easy area to begin experimenting with new ideas involving 
the relationships between the two is the tax system itself. Here 
churches have been placed into the nonprofit 501 sector, and then 
into the smaller 501(c)(3) charitable group sector, with no guide­
lines on exactly what defines a "church." And with the churches 
themselves being uncomfortable with this placement, due to 
restrictions that they believe inhibit them from providing their 
public witness. There is also concern regarding the rationale for 
their own tax exemption. My recommendation is to declare all the 
churches a special type of institution, which requires its own 
distinct tax classification either within the 503 sector or in an 
entirely new sector created for churches alone, thus giving them
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full identification as a necessary and vital component of our 
communal life that deserves to be independently validated.
I believe that this would be welcomed by many in the American 
public today. Most citizens celebrate the freedom of religion and 
the ability to attend any church they wish, but they have concerns 
about churches. There are some within the general public who are 
not fully convinced that all churches are completely charitable 
organizations. Alan Ware pointed to this concern when he noted 
that with:
The blurring of the boundaries between market, 
state, and IOs [Intermediate Origanizations, of which 
churches represent the majority] has helped to focus 
public attention on the inadequacy of many of the 
mechanisms for regulating the affairs of IOs.9
What appears to be happening is that public support is weakening 
for the additional privileges churches have enjoyed over other 
charities in America.10 At the same time, many within the 
public believe that proper respect is not given either to churches 
or to religious belief in our society. Stephen L. Carter's 
book, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics
Trivialize Religious Devotion, is an illustration of this type of 
belief. By fully recognizing churches as a distinct group whose 
major concern is with religious thought, a clearer understanding 
can be given to the public.
In addition, another public concern has recently surfaced 
regarding how our society defines a church. The 1992 Religions
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Bodies in the United States:__A Directory. which provided "a
comprehensive listing of each religious group known to be operat­
ing in the United States in the summer of 1991,1,11 included 
not only the traditional religious faiths: Christianity, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Latter-Day Saints, Metaphysical/Ancient 
Wisdom/New Age, Shinto, and Taoism; but also the Unclassified 
Religious Groups. This group included:
not only a number of unique perspectives to 
religion, but a variety of "non-religious" organiza­
tions for whom atheism functions much as religion 
does for believers. [Plus] A number of mail order 
churches, those which offer ordination through the 
mail for a small fee to any who ask, which have 
little or no doctrinal position.12
One of these churches listed is the "Freedom from Religion" 
Foundation. It was founded in 1978 by Anne Nicoi Gaylor and other
former members of American Atheists, Inc.13 The American public
is confused when such groups are legally recognized as churches 
and automatically receive charitable status with its tax benefits, 
and yet appear to have no recognized components of religion in 
them. For religion does have some clearly accepted, recognized 
components.
It is not unusual for the development of American public
dissatisfaction or concern to create a climate that leads to 
change. As Konvitz has noted: "Americans are constantly
changing their views about the proper province of the state___
limits on the legitimate powers of government are not frozen."14
104
Frequently, the American public has been the catalyst to major 
changes within the organization of our society. As controversy 
over church/state interaction continues, dissatisfaction among the 
public continues to grow. There is a great need to begin to look 
for a way through this difficulty. How might the country begin to 
handle these concerns? The need is to provide a means for both 
more clarity for the public in general and a clearer comprehension 
of the specific needs of the churches.
I have proposed that it begin with the establishment of a new 
classification within the IRS Tax Code, developed for churches 
alone. In order to proceed with this idea, there needs to be 
established an accepted definition of what constitutes a "church." 
Since churches are accepted as the major visible representative of 
religion and religious thought in society, it is vital that they 
contain elements that are generally accepted as being components 
of religion. Therefore, the definition needs to distinguish 
between what is religion and nonreligion.
Any definition of religion that failed to 
distinguish religion from nonreligion would empty 
the religion clauses of their fundamental meaning 
and elevate to the status of religion every conceiv­
able set of ideas or philosophy that any individual 
claimed to be central to his or her life.16
But where would we go to for such a definition? I recognize this
is an area that frightens everyone. How can we define religion 
without offending someone? We probably can't, but we can truly
try not to do so. An example of one way to do this is given in a
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study conducted by the Search Institute in the late 1970s. It 
involved seeking an understanding of the religious positions that 
members of the United States Congress held. In the study, titled 
Religion on Canitol Hill: Mvths and Realities, the first step was 
to discover what is basically accepted as the contents of the word 
“religion." The staff did this by going directly to the world of 
religious knowledge.
Beginning with positions papers from noted scholars regarding 
their own definition of religion, a symposium was held and the 
definition was debated, the goal being to develop comprehensive 
understanding of the components of "religion." This information, 
together with reading done by the staff, resulted in the formula­
tion of criteria for a definition of religion and religious belief 
that could serve as a foundation for the research proposed.16 
After several more carefully devised steps, they arrived at the 
following definitions of religion and religious beliefs. Notice 
that this definition clearly places religion on an individual 
level, where American Thought has also placed it.
Religion (at the individual level) is the cognitions 
(values, beliefs, thoughts), affect (feelings, attitudes), 
and behaviors involved in apprehending and responding to 
a reality (a supernatural being or beings, force, energy, 
principle, absolute consiousness) that is affirmed to exist. 
This reality must have the following characteristics:
1. It is a reality than which nothing greater can
be conceived.
2. It is not dependent on human life for its existence.
3. It is, to some degree, beyond human voluntary control.
4. It is ultimate reality in the sense that it stands
behind, sustains, controls, energizes, or holds together 
the diverse phenomena of the natural/physical/material 
world.
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Religious beliefs are the truth-claims one makes in 
apprehending and responding to his or her concept of the 
Religious Reality. This includes the claims made about 
the nature of this reality and those made about cosmos, 
nature, self, people, society, and history which have been 
shaped by the affirmation and apprehension of this 
reality.17
From these definitions, the group then searched to discover the 
various belief categories common to all religious traditions, 
"whether these be formal, institutionalized religions like 
Judaism; or modern religious movements like Hare Krishna; or 
private, personal religions that have no name."18 Here they 
found seven ultimate Religious Reality categories that they 
determined to convey the scope of religious territory.
What I am suggesting is that Congress needs to work directly 
with the religious communities of our society to define this 
necessary area of our communal life. There is already an example 
of Congress working with religious groups to produce a consensus 
for passage of legislation that helped clarify an issue that had 
dominated the legislative church-state agenda for some time. The 
resulting legislation was the Equal Access Act of 1984, PL 98-377, 
which helped define national policy with respect to religious 
observance in the schools. Allen D. Hertzke's book, Representing 
God in Washington, contains an entire chapter describing the 
coalition that worked to put this piece of legislation 
together.10
It is my belief that only by putting the political and 
religious systems of our society back into their own proper
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domains of working together (rather than separately) can the 
individuals of our society begin to work together for the 
improvement of all of our lives. The continual use of the phrase 
"separation of church and state" suggests that there are two 
distinct bodies set apart from each other in contrast if not in 
conflict. This idea needs to be eliminated, for " church and 
state" are simply us, we the people, in different configurations. 
In the book, Rights Talk. Mary Ann Glendon argued that:
(T)he "moral core" of our public order is a 
commitment to public justification, that is, to an 
ongoing process of demanding, offering, and testing 
public moral arguments and reasons. Such a commitment, 
it must be acknowledged assumes that men and women are 
capable of giving and accepting the kinds of reasons 
which are not mere references to narrow interests, but 
which can survive critical examination and be widely 
seen to be good.20
I see "religious thinking" clearly having a role in this kind of 
discourse. Alan D. Hertzke has suggested, in his study of the 
role religious lobbies play in American politics, that they 
broaden the representativeness of the entire system, force the 
elites to address unarticulated needs and values of the general 
public and, thus, are a generally healthy development.21
By providing a separate classification for churches within 
the federal tax system, there will be less confusion regarding 
what constitutes a church. It would also provide an autonomous 
arena in which the churches would be incorporated into a major 
political sector of our society, the tax system. By having a
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totally separate classification, the necessary explanation for 
other social, economic and political characteristics possessed by 
churches could be addressed.
Is it valuable to our society as a whole for churches to 
remain totally tax exempt?
Do churches have a corporate responsibility to their own 
individual communities to participate in the payment 
for services received, i.e., fire and police protection?
Why should churches be the only corporate institutions 
that do not have to financially report to any public 
authority?
Should churches be expected to pay taxes on any profit 
they make?
What kind of corporate responsiblity should society expect 
to see exhibited by churches?
What about "the mantle of religion" that has been placed 
on churches to be the representative of "seeking the good" 
together?
In regards to this last question, concern has been voiced that 
perhaps this voice has been lost. Harold J. Berman asserted that:
In short, religion has lost most of its importance 
as a way of addressing publicly the major social problems 
of our society. It has become increasingly a matter of 
the private relationship between the believer and God.22
By placing all of our churches together into their own separate 
sphere within the tax system, they could begin to regain a public 
voice. Working together, drawing upon the teachings of all the 
world's great religious traditions, they might help the American 
people reunite our love of individual freedom with our sense of a 
community for which we all accept and share common responsibility.
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The necessary first step in this opening process is to refute 
the idea that the Constitution itself has limited the authority of 
government to enact laws dealing with churches by requiring that a 
separation exist between the two that limits the ability of each 
to speak directly to the other in their own areas of accepted 
concern and responsibility.
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4. A listing of the five major theories presently being cited 
on what should comprise such "separation" was given in 
Endnote 3 of Chapter I, page 11.
5. Milton R. Konvitz, Religious Liberty and Conscience 
(New York, 1968), p. 84. Quoted from Paine's The 
Age-of-Reason-
6. Harold J. Berman, "Religious Freedom and the Challenge
of the Modern State," James Davison Hunter and Os Guinness, 
eds., Articles of Faith. Articles of Peace: The Religious 
Liberty Clauses and the American Public Philosophy 
(Washington, D.C., 1990), p.40.
7. David Feliman, Religion in American Public Law. (Boston, 
1965), p. 8.
8. There is speculation that "religion" itself is an element of 
our human consciousness. Here are four examples of this type 
of speculation.
A) Mircea Eliade's insistence that religious thinking 
is actually "an element in the structure of human 
consciousness, not a stage in the history of 
consciousness." He maintained that religion offers 
a true fullness to living, to life: "to be — or, 
rather,to become— a man means to be "religious," 
pp. vi-vii.
Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning of
Ill
Religion (Chicago, 1969).
B) Kenneth Wald asserts that the simple "durability of 
religion" appears to be rooted in human nature, p. 12.
Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United 
States (New York, 1987).
C) Michael Oakeshott defined "religion" as "life itself."
Religion, then, is not, as some would 
persuade us, an interest attached to life, a 
subsidiary activity; nor is it a power which 
governs life from the outside with a, no doubt 
divine, but certainly incomprehensible, sanction 
for its authority. It is simply life itself, 
life dominated by the belief that its value is 
in the present, not merely the past or the 
future, that if we lose ourselves we lose 
all. (p. 34)
Fuller, Timothy, ed., Religion. Politics, and the Moral 
Life: Micheal Oakeshott (New Haven, 1993). This 
collection of Oakeshott's writings was published after 
his death.
D) John Hick declares that research into all of the great 
world faiths shows that there is total agreement that 
ultimately there is only one Reality (God, force, 
energy, or absolute consciousness).
It therefore seems evident that this one 
God is somehow being encountered in different
ways within these different traditions all of
which reinforced the realization that our very 
different religious traditions constitute alter­
native human contexts of response to the one 
ultimate transcendent divine Reality, (p. 141)
[Emphas i s mine.]
John Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the 
Philosophy of Religion (New Haven, 1993).
9. Alan Ware, Between Profit and State: Intermediate Organiza­
tions in Britain and the United States (Princeton, New 
Jersey), p. 201.
10. Ibid., p. 200.
11. J. Gordon Melton, Religious Bodies in the United States:
A Directory (New York, 1992), p. vii.
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13. Ibid., p. 271.
14. Konvitz, Religious Liberty and Conscience, pp. vii-viii.
15. Derek Davis, "The Courts and the Meaning of "Religion":
A History and Critique, James E. Wood, Jr. and Derek Davis,
eds., The Role of Government in Monitoring and Regulating
Religion in Public Life (Waco, Texas, 1993), p. 115.
16. Peter L. Benson and Dorothy L. Williams, Religion on 
Capitol Hill: Myths and Realities (San Francisco,
1982), pp.9-10.
17. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
18. Ibid.
19. Allen D. Hertzke, Representing God in Washington. The Role 
of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity (Knoxville, 
Tennessee, 1988), pp. 161-198.
20. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of 
Political Discourse (New York, 1991), p. 176.
21. Hertzke, Representing God in Washington, p. 206.
22. Berman, "Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the 
Modern State," p. 50.
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